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Abstract: In early 2012, the Spanish state came under strong market pressure due to its 
engagement in round after round of large-scale bank bailouts. The country’s joint sovereign-
bank crisis shed new light on the nature of the euro area’s crisis. European decision-makers 
were forced to openly recognize the non-fiscal – that is, the banking and monetary – causes of 
sovereign distress and to accept the need for drastic policy solutions. The policy shift soon 
took concrete form with the launch of the Banking Union project in June 2012. The principal 
intention was to break the bank-sovereign link and to relieve the euro area’s weaker economies 
from the almost impossible burden of having to finance bank bailouts out of national fiscal 
resources. The mutualization of bailout costs through a common ‘fiscal backstop’ was, in other 
words, the key objective of the Banking Union as originally conceived. Subsequent policy 
choices, however, have marked a relaxation, if not partial abandonment, of this objective. The 
policy approach eventually adopted with regard to resolution financing in the context of the 
Banking Union’s Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is based on the burden-sharing norms 
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), the instrument harmonizing bank 
resolution regimes across the EU. This guarantees the legal consistency of resolution 
frameworks within and outside the euro area. It is less certain, whether the chosen approach 
can insulate national state finances from the costs of bank bailouts and/or ensure the full 
equalization of the financial conditions for bank resolution everywhere in the euro area. The 
sufficiency of the planned common financial instruments is a particular concern.  
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The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 triggered in Europe three overlapping 
phases of economic distress (section 1). At first, just like in the US, the troubles 
centred on the banking sector, spreading from there to the real economy. The 
fiscal implications were also significant for almost all member states. The need to 
bail out failed banks, support the continuing operation of the credit mechanism 
and provide countercyclical relief to the ailing economy, by means of both the 
automatic fiscal stabilizers and discretionary budgetary expansion, led to very high 
budgetary deficits for 2008 and 2009. Still, in its early phase the crisis was 
perceived as essentially global and bank-based, not fiscal. So were the policy 
responses. The crisis brought out into the open blind spots and design flaws in the 
pre-crisis framework of banking regulation (including bank crisis management). 
For their correction, extensive banking reforms were undertaken at the national 
and Union levels. To a large extent, the reforms reflected a broad regulatory 
agenda adopted globally under the auspices of the G20. They also included the 
introduction of a special resolution regime for failed banks. Originally adopted by 
leading member states such as the UK and Germany, the new approach to bank 
resolution was subsequently accepted by the whole Union, in the form of the 
harmonized European framework of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(‘BRRD’).1  
In the meantime, however, a second wave of crisis engulfed in quick 
succession three countries in the periphery of the euro area (Greece, Portugal, and 
Ireland). The proximate cause was the inability of those state’s governments to 
maintain their access to sovereign debt markets. Initially, their predicament was 
attributed to bad fiscal management and/or profligacy – a country-specific failure 
of governance. The European response involved the creation of special financial 
assistance mechanisms for the countries of the euro area, as well as a 
comprehensive revision of the EMU’s economic governance arrangements, with a 
view to establishing fiscal discipline at the national level and ensuring the early 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances.  
Nonetheless, by early 2012, with Spain coming under increasing market 
pressure, the euro area’s troubles morphed into a joint sovereign-bank crisis. The 
Spanish predicament shed new light on the fundamental aetiology of the region’s 
problems. It revealed the extent to which the supposedly idiosyncratic governance 
failures of the peripheral countries were structurally linked to the overall 
institutional set-up and operation of the euro area. The monetary and financial 
conditions prevailing in the region from the advent of the single currency in 1999 
                                                     
1 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and 
(EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2014 No. L173/190.  
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to the Global Financial Crisis a decade later had contributed, imperceptibly but 
fatefully, to the aggravation of macroeconomic divergences between the centre 
and the periphery. Through a distorted credit allocation mechanism, the 
interlinked banking systems of the single currency area (now based on a highly 
integrated wholesale market) fuelled major disequilibria in the pre-crisis years. The 
banks financed amply and cheaply the rapid growth in public and private 
consumption in the economies of the periphery. Rather than reflecting permanent 
gains in productive capacity and improvements in competitiveness, the debt-
fuelled growth in incomes and consumption was driven by inflows of liquidity 
from abroad, which eventually turned into a primary cause of high relative 
inflation and loss of competitiveness (always compared to the countries of the 
euro area’s centre, out of whose trading surpluses and savings the periphery’s 
debts were financed). Following the eruption of the Global Financial Crisis, the 
arrangements of the monetary union interacted in perverse ways with the EU’s 
pre-existing single market framework. Crucially, the latter allocated the 
responsibility, not only for the ongoing supervision, but also for the resolution of 
credit institutions to the home countries. The consequences were dire, for both 
the states and the banking systems of the euro area’s periphery. The region was 
plunged into an unprecedented crisis of confidence, which placed in question the 
very survival of the single currency and, by extension, of the European project as a 
whole.  
As a result of the Spanish episode, European decision-makers were forced to 
openly recognize the non-fiscal – namely, banking and monetary – causes of 
sovereign distress. This recognition made imperative a substantial and drastic shift 
in the European policy stance. The Banking Union project was thus launched in 
June 2012 as a direct response to the euro area’s crisis. The immediate intention 
was to relieve the euro area’s weaker economies from the almost unbearable 
burden of having to finance domestic bank-rescue operations (or bailouts) with 
national fiscal resources. The prerequisite for a mutualization of bailout costs, 
however, was the centralization of the responsibility for banking supervision and 
resolution in the euro area, so as to preclude the externalization of the fiscal costs 
of regulatory failure by countries with lax regulatory regimes (section 2).  
Through a more effective regulatory and supervisory control of European 
banks, the Banking Union’s supervisory leg, namely, the ECB-based Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), is bound to contribute to the streamlining of the 
euro area’s financial landscape. However, to break the vicious circle between 
sovereign-debt and banking troubles, thus ensuring the stabilization of the 
peripheral countries’ situation and a full integration of the euro area’s financial 
system (which during the crisis years largely decomposed into separate national 
systems, with divergent monetary and financial behaviour), the centralization of 
banking resolution arrangements is also necessary. The establishment of the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is an important, but yet incomplete, step in this 
direction (section 3). To be effective, it must be supported by credible and 
uniform arrangements for the financing of resolution actions. This is a key 
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component of the future resolution regime, with major ramifications for its 
capacity to equalize the conditions of operation and competition across banks and 
national banking markets (section 4). The policy solutions finally adopted in 
connection to the financing of resolution within the SRM are largely based on the 
norms of the BRRD (section 5). This guarantees the legal consistency of 
resolution frameworks across the EU. It is less certain, however, whether they also 
ensure the effectiveness and uniformity of resolution actions within the euro area’s 




1. PERMUTATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
In Europe, and in particular in the euro area, the Global Financial Crisis activated 
not a single shock, but a set of consecutive – and, in our view, interrelated – crises. 
Each crisis (or, depending on how one sees it, each successive phase of the 
underlying, more general disease) was marked by distinctive symptoms. Due to 
this, each permutation provided the basis for distinct, and partially inconsistent, 
narratives and interpretations of what went wrong, and engendered diverse policy 
responses.  
 
FIRST PHASE, 2008‒09: A REGIONAL EXPRESSION OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
 
The first phase, lasting roughly from late 2008 to the end of 2009, had global 
dimensions (thus affecting all member states simultaneously and in the same 
sense), unmistakably financial aetiology and primarily financial symptoms. It was a 
systemic banking crisis of gigantic proportions; and it was immediately interpreted 
as proof that the global financial system, including its European component, was 
plagued by deep-seated problems and required urgent and extensive repair. The 
policy response encompassed the wide-ranging re-regulatory initiatives. The 
insistence on the need for SRRs was a central element of this global wave of 
financial re-regulation.  
At the EU level, in view of the lack of prior steps in this direction, the sudden 
incorporation of SRRs in the Commission’s legislative programme following the 
crisis marks a substantial turn in the evolution of European banking policy. But 
this is not the end of the story. Between the first tentative proposals for a 
European framework for bank crisis management in 2010 and the BRRD’s final 
adoption in 2014, the European financial, economic and political landscape had 
changed dramatically. The draft BRRD was conceived as a rather typical 
harmonizing measure: it would set common parameters in relation to the 
resolution of failed banks, but would still depend for its practical application on 
national actors, namely, the various resolution authorities designated by the 
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member states. More generally, in the BRRD’s initial setting, the national 
responsibility for crisis management was not called into question. Just as the 
incorporation in European law of Basel III was not supposed to affect the 
allocation of the responsibility for front-line supervision to the member states’ 
national competent authorities, the original intention was that the responsibilities 
for bank resolution and, where necessary, rescue operations would remain strictly 
national. Bank restructuring would be supported by exclusively national financial 
resources, namely, funds raised from the domestic banking sector in the form of 
pre-funded DGSs and resolution funds and, as a final backstop, national fiscal 
resources. No specific tools were provided for to deal with the collapse of large 
cross-border banks, with the exception of coordination through colleges of 
supervisory and resolution authorities. The possibility of cross-national financial 
assistance, especially in the form of fiscal transfers, for the purpose of bailing out 
failed banks was not entertained. And the role of supranational institutions in bank 
resolution was essentially confined to the responsibility of the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Competition for the prior approval of restructuring plans. 
In this allocation of burdens, the predicament of governments within the euro area 
which, faced with a banking crisis of systemic proportions, lack the fiscal space for 
raising the amounts required for stabilization was perceived as a primarily fiscal 
problem. As such, situations of this type would justify, at most, the provision of 
collective financial assistance to the relevant government through the euro area’s 
collective country-rescue mechanisms, which were created starting in 2010 
(EFSF/ESM).2 This was, indeed, what happened in the case of Ireland in 
November 2010 and of Spain in June 2012.  
Of course, the regulatory reforms did not obviate the need for immediate 
financial interventions, seeking to counteract the economic downturn and, in 
particular, to provide relief to the banking sector. In terms of practical crisis 
management, Europe’s governmental response relied primarily on national actions, 
which combined expansionary fiscal measures with the provision of massive 
support facilities in favour of the ailing domestic banking systems. Significantly, 
however, the measures adopted at the time did not entail a concerted and 
convincing cleansing of banks’ balance sheets, through the removal of bad loans 
from their portfolios. National supervisory authorities were often reluctant to 
press their domestic banks to recognize in full their potential losses from non-
performing or doubtful loans. This contributed to the perpetuation of a climate of 
uncertainty, marked by market reservations regarding the true state of many 
significant banks.  
Especially in the euro area, credit intermediation remained inadequate, as 
attested by a flight to safe assets, weak interbank lending and the hoarding of 
liquid reserves. Even the ECB’s measures of monetary and credit easing3 proved 
                                                     
2 See below, n. 114‒116 and accompanying text.  
3 In recent years, the ECB has utilized both conventional and unconventional tools in its attempt to 
support demand and provide liquidity to the banking sector. Not only has it maintained its key policy rate 
(main refinancing operation rate) at record low levels, but has also engaged in extraordinary long-term 
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ineffectual, with recipient banks often retaining the money lent by the ECB liquid 
form in central bank deposit accounts as a safeguard or, what was worse, using it 
to the purchase of public debt instruments issued by their home country . And in 
countries in the region’s periphery non-performing loans continued to pile rapidly 
in banks’ portfolios.4  
 
SECOND PHASE, 2010‒11: THE EURO AREA’S ‘SOVEREIGN DEBT’ CRISES 
 
While in other parts of the world the banking markets gradually returned to 
normality, in Europe the financial and economic recovery was hesitant, or worse. 
Moreover, the original crisis soon mutated into further economic and financial 
troubles, which hit with particular force the euro area, eventually placing in doubt 
the very survival of its single currency. The causes were apparently unrelated to the 
financial sector (or, for that matter, to the euro area’s monetary arrangements). 
Indeed, this second phase took the form of a series of sovereign debt crises, which 
engulfed one by one the weaker, and allegedly less disciplined fiscally, economies 
in the euro area’s periphery. Between late 2009 and early 2012, the sustainability of 
the public finances, first of Greece, and then of Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, and 
even Spain, attracted in succession the strong and unforgiving scrutiny of the 
international capital markets. As a result, these countries either found themselves 
effectively cut off from the international capital markets or faced exceedingly high 
borrowing costs (expressed as rapidly rising interest-rate spreads over the rate 
charged on German sovereign debt issues, eventually rendering unsustainable the 
peripheral countries’ cost of refinancing). The problems of the banking sector 
were thus eclipsed by a new, more pressing concern. In terms of immediate policy 
reactions, the situation was addressed through the provision to the countries 
affected by refinancing problems of large-scale emergency financial assistance; this 
came from their euro area partners and the IMF in the form of unprecedented 
financial assistance programmes, involving large-scale lending at attractive rates, 
subject to tough conditionality. In the Greek case such assistance was initially 
provided ad hoc, but the bailout system was soon regularized through the creation, 
first of a temporary collective mechanism, the European Financial Stabilization 
Fund (EFSF),5 and then of a permanent mechanism, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM).6 Both were formed outside the framework of the Union, 
                                                                                                                                       
refinancing operations (LTROs), including two operations of very long-term duration (36-month 
maturities), which provided ample liquidity to the banking system at low rates.  
4 See, e.g., OECD, ‘OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area’ (April 2014), p. 18.  
5 EFSF Framework Agreement (7 June 2010), as amended.  
6 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (2 February 2012), as amended. 
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although an amendment to the TFEU now ensures their recognition by, and 
compatibility with, the EU Treaty system.7  
Initially, many observers attributed the crises in the euro area’s peripheral 
countries almost exclusively to idiosyncratic domestic policy errors – especially the 
national governments’ disregard for financial constraints (‘fiscal irresponsibility’) 
and a refusal to comply with European standards on public finances. If there was a 
collective European fault, this was thought to consist in the lax enforcement by 
the Econfin/Eurogroup of the Treaty provisions prohibiting excessive deficits and 
establishing a special enforcement procedure (‘excessive deficit procedure’ or 
‘EDP’)8 and the related, but more detailed norms of the so-called Stability and 
Growth Pact (‘SGP’).9 Later on, as the crisis came to hit countries with solid fiscal 
performance and a blameless record of compliance with the EDP, such as Ireland 
and Spain, the interpretations gradually and almost imperceptibly shifted towards 
recognizing the significance of broader macroeconomic imbalances between the 
countries of the centre of the euro area and those of the periphery. Such 
imbalances had built up in the decade since the adoption of the single currency, 
eroding the competitiveness of the periphery. Despite the recognition of this 
factor, however, the dominant interpretation amongst European policy-makers 
continued to place the blame on the ‘policy mistakes’ of the peripheral countries 
and to emphasize the need for fiscal discipline under all circumstances. 
As a result, the correction of the underlying situation was pursued to a large 
extent on a country-by-country basis. Each of the troubled countries was called to 
follow a programme of fiscal retrenchment and far-reaching structural adjustment 
measures. Depending on the country-specific circumstances, the latter were 
intended to liberalize the domestic economy, restore its international 
competitiveness or overhaul the national financial system. In return, the rest of the 
euro area, led by Germany, offered (somewhat reluctantly) to provide large-scale 
bridge financing, as necessary for keeping thing running. It was taken for granted 
that any assistance should be contingent on strict and unforgiving policy 
conditionality. The notion that lender countries might need to make converse 
macroeconomic adjustments (for instance, by relaxing their own fiscal policy 
stance) was dismissed out of hand. Equally, intermittent proposals for joint debt 
issuance were ignored.  
                                                     
7 TFEU, art. 136(3), inserted in the Treaty in pursuance of the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU 
of 25 March 2011, OJ 2001 L91/1; and The compatibility of the ESM with EU law was confirmed by the 
CJEU in Case C-370/12, Pringle, judgment of 27 November 2012, OJ 2013 No. C26/15. 
8 TFEU, art. 126; and Protocol (No. 12) on the Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
9 The SGP was originally based on the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the 
Stability and Growth Pact, OJ 1997 No. C236/1. The original operative rules were revised in 2005, to 
ensure greater discretion and flexibility (and, effectively, greater laxity) in their application. Council 
regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 1997 L209/1, as amended by 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1055/2005, OJ 2005 No. L 174/1; and Council regulation (EC) No. 
1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure, OJ 2005 No. L209/6, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1056/2005, OJ 2005 No. 
L 174 1/5.  
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Over and above the country-specific adjustment programmes, the more 
general and longer-term policy response focused at this stage on the 
‘reinforcement’ on a permanent and highly institutionalized footing of the euro 
area’s economic governance system. The relevant reform programme, outlined in 
pronouncements made by the Commission as early as May 201010 and turned into 
binding legal texts in the following years,11 was directed towards strengthening to 
the maximum extent possible the mechanisms for preventative and corrective 
enforcement of the rules on the avoidance of fiscal deficits, including by increasing 
the automaticity of their application.12 These rules were now supplemented with 
further enforcement mechanisms for the avoidance and ‘correction’ of 
macroeconomic imbalances.13 The latter are intended to compel countries facing 
loss of competitiveness and growing trading deficits to adopt early on strict 
adjustment policies.  
 
THIRD PHASE, 2012: THE BANK-SOVEREIGN NEXUS 
 
The first round of country bailouts in 2010 (covering Greece, Portugal, and 
Ireland) offered a rather short respite. The political cacophony which 
characterized the opening of discussions on the establishment of the ESM as the 
                                                     
10 European Commission, Communication on ‘Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination’, COM(2010) 
250 final (12 May 2005); and Communication on ‘Enhancing economic policy Coordination for Stability, 
Growth and Jobs – Tools for Stronger EU Economic Governance’ COM(2010) 367 final (30 June 2010).  
11 The reform of the economic governance framework took the form two legislative packages, the so ‘six-
pack’ of 2011 and the ‘two-pack’ of 2013. These included:  Regulation (EU) No.1173/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ 2011 No. L306/1; Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011 No. L306/8; Regulation (EU) No. 
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 No. L306/12; Regulation (EU) No. 
1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 No. L306/25; Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 
November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 No. L306/33; Directive 2011/85/EU of the 
Council of 8 November 2011 on the requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ 
2011 No. L306/41; Regulation No. 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area 
experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, OJ 2013 No. 
L140/1; and Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, OJ 2013 No. L140/11.  
12 Beyond the two legislative packages (‘six-pack’ and ‘two-pack’) mentioned in the previous note, the 
attempts to entrench fiscal discipline included high-level political commitments and a separate treaty; 
‘Euro Plus Pact’, Conclusions of the euro area summit of 11 March 2011, endorsed by the European 
Council in its own Conclusions of 25 March 2011, paras. 11‒12 and Annex I; and Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (‘Fiscal Compact’ or ‘TSCG’), 
signed on 2 March 2012 by 25 of the then 27 EU member states (but not by the UK or the Czech 
Republic, nor by Croatia, which acceded subsequently to the Union, but not to the Fiscal Compact).  
13 See Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011, OJ 2011 No. L306/8; and Regulation (EU) No. 1176/2011, OJ 
2011 No. L306/25.  
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euro area’s permanent bailout mechanism in late 2010 was complemented by 
Germany’s insistence that the ‘orderly default’ of euro area sovereigns (whereby 
losses would fall on their private creditors) should not be excluded in the future.14 
The assumption that, despite the ‘no bailout’ clause in the TFEU,15 the 
governments of the euro area would always provide de facto support to one 
another, thus turning the risk of sovereign default into a theoretical possibility – an 
assumption effectively validated by the Greek case earlier in the year – was now 
openly challenged. This contributed to a shift in risk perceptions and fuelled the 
uncertainty of the private sector.16  
From July 2011 onwards, official plans for the restructuring of the Greek 
public debt in the form of a deep ‘haircut’ and drastic rescheduling of sovereign 
bond obligations to the private sector (the so-called ‘Private Finance Initiative’, or 
‘PSI’) promised to inflict substantial losses on existing debtholders, both domestic 
and foreign. The significant exposure of many large and medium-sized banks to 
the sovereign debts of Greece and other troubled countries intensified the 
markets’ doubts about their solvency. This factor, in combination with continuing 
high levels of leverage and, above all, rapidly growing fears that the euro area’s 
currency union might unravel, with one or more of its member countries exiting, 
seriously disrupted the interbank market. Accessing liquidity became significantly 
more expensive and difficult, especially for banks in the euro area’s peripheral 
economies. In the early months of 2012, the perverse dynamics of the latter 
(whereby the sovereigns’ fiscal problems dovetailed with the considerable 
weakness of domestic banking systems, in a feedback mechanism) led to a major 
rekindling of the crisis, which thus entered into its third distinct phase.  
This started from Spain, the EU’s fifth largest economy. As the country had a 
stellar record of compliance with the SGP in the pre-crisis years, it would be 
totally implausible to attribute its woes to fiscal profligacy. Instead, the root of the 
problem lied in the Spanish government’s flawed attempt to recapitalize the 
banking sector during the first phase of the crisis, back in 2010. At the time, the 
authorities had not insisted on a full recognition of the banking sector’s bad asset 
problems; moreover, the recapitalizations had been carried out on terms that did 
not secure the permanence of the capital injections. The key problem was Bankia, 
the country’s fourth largest bank, which had been created as recently as December 
2010, through the consolidation of the operations of several ailing savings banks 
(cajas de ahorros). Instead of constituting the hoped-for solution to their distress, 
Bankia was now itself in need of a massive bailout. Due to the evident and 
pressing need for the state to engage in a second round of large-scale bank 
                                                     
14 The notion was first aired by the German leadership on 4 May 2010; Tony Czuczka, ‘Merkel’s Coalition 
Calls for EU “Orderly” Defaults (Update1)’, Bloomberg.com, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQdqR8poZMoo&pos=9. Six months 
later, it had gained sufficient clout to be incorporated in the official Eurogroup policy; ‘Statement by the 
Eurogroup’ on the ESM, 28 November 2010.  
15 TFEU, art. 125. 
16 Dauville, 28 Nov conclusions, December European Council.  
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recapitalizations, by early 2012 the government was rapidly losing its access to the 
capital markets.  
The escalation of the Spanish troubles brought to everybody’s attention the 
perverse loop between weak banks and fiscally weak sovereigns. Early in the crisis, 
the Governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King had observed that ‘global 
banks are global in life but national in death’.17 It had now become patently 
obvious that this applied with a vengeance to the banks of the euro area. In the 
pre-crisis period, euro area banks had taken full advantage of their European 
freedoms of movement and had exploited eagerly the opportunities offered by the 
newly unified euro money market to access ample amounts overseas liquidity. As a 
result of the crisis, however, crossborder liquidity lines had been disrupted, thus 
putting extreme pressure on banks in the periphery and, through them, on their 
domestic economies, whose contraction was aggravated by the paralysis of the 
credit provision mechanism; this fed back into the situation of the banks 
themselves, amplifying the deterioration of their assets. Faced with impending 
insolvency, the banks had turned to their national governments for support. With 
the responsibility for bank resolution falling solely to the home country (or, 
following a dissolution of a cross-border group, being split between the countries 
of operation according to the geographical break down of operations), the national 
taxpayers were thus called to shoulder the full cost of recapitalization. Whenever 
the home country was not large enough, or sufficiently rich, to bear the costs, 
matters were brought to a deadlock. In this respect, the case of Spain was not 
different from that of Ireland, which preceded it, or that of Cyprus, which 
followed. However, the size of the Spanish economy and the high probability of 
transmission of its crisis to another large member state, namely, Italy (and 
potentially even to France), set its case apart. Indeed, the ‘Spanish’ crisis created 
doubts, not only about the resilience of national economies, but about the viability 




2. THE BIRTH OF THE BANKING UNION: CRITICAL JUNCTURE 
AND RADICAL POLICY TURN 
 
The imminent threat of contagion led decision-makers at the European level to 
revise their frame of interpretation of the crisis and to reconsider the remedies. As 
its monetary-financial aetiology and ramifications emerged to light, the ‘sovereign 
debt’ crisis morphed into the ‘euro’ crisis. The obvious, but hitherto neglected, 
cross-border loops in the catastrophic financial dynamics were now acknowledged, 
and new goals and priorities were set in an effort to save the euro area. The long-
                                                     
17 Mervyn King, as quoted by Adair Turner, speech at the press conference for the presentation of the 
Turner Review (18 March 2009).  
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debated, but extremely controversial and difficult to implement, idea of a fiscal 
union was brought up again by certain commentators. However, a different, but 
no less challenging prospect emerged from nowhere to gain traction almost 
immediately: that of a ‘banking union’.18 Many academics, economic journalists 
and think tanks were already promoting the view that the crisis can only be tackled 
through concerted action on the fiscal and the banking fronts – in particular, 
through the centralization and federalization of the responsibility for banking 
supervision and restructuring in the European Union or, at least, in the euro area; 
but up till then their views had found limited resonance at the level of official 
European policy. Now, however, the Spanish quandary had brought the bank-
sovereign dynamics to the centre of global and European policy-makers’ attention. 
The conditions were propitious for policy innovations.   
It was the IMF’s Managing Director Christine Lagarde who, on 17 April 
2012, first placed on the policy agenda the notion of a fully centralized legal and 
institutional framework for the euro area’s banking system. In her view, moving to 
‘unified supervision, a single bank resolution authority with a common backstop, 
and a single deposit insurance fund’ would constitute a necessary financial-
regulatory complement to the monetary union and provide a means for breaking 
the perverse bank-sovereign loop.19 An idea whose time had come, it only required 
a very short time to move from this initial act of semi-official endorsement to 
general and full acceptance as a basic pillar of European policy. On 25 April 2012 
it was espoused by the new President of the ECB Mario Draghi, who declared his 
support for centralised banking supervision and resolution at European level.20  
On 23 May 2012, in the course of an informal European Council dinner, 
Commission President Barroso apparently proposed a move in this direction, but 
                                                     
18 The term was probably coined by the policy expert Nicolas Véron a few months earlier; see Nicolas 
Véron, ‘Europe Must Change Course on Banks’, VoxEU.org,, 22 December 2011, 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/europe-must-change-course-banks.   
19 Christine Lagarde, ‘Opening Remarks’, IMF/CFP Policy Roundtable on the Future of Financial 
Regulation (17 April 2012): ‘We must break the vicious cycle of banks hurting sovereigns and sovereigns 
hurting banks. This works both ways. Making banks stronger, including by restoring adequate capital 
levels, stop banks from hurting sovereigns through higher debt or contingent liabilities. And restoring 
confidence in sovereign debt helps banks, which are important holders of such debt and typically benefit 
from explicit or implicit guarantees from sovereigns. [...] In the euro zone, a single financial market 
cannot rely on legal and institutional frameworks that operate on an asymmetric national basis. To break 
the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks, we need more risk sharing across borders in the 
banking system. In the near term, a pan-euro area facility that has the capacity to take direct stakes in 
banks would help. Looking further ahead, monetary union needs to be supported by stronger financial 
integration which our analysis suggests be in the form of unified supervision, a single bank resolution 
authority with a common backstop, and a single deposit insurance fund.’  
20 Mario Draghi, ‘Introductory Statement’ before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 
the European Parliament (25 April 2012): ‘I see financial stability clearly as a common responsibly in a 
monetary union. During the crisis, we have observed strong negative spill-over effects across euro area 
countries and between the banking sector and its respective sovereign. National supervisors and 
Treasuries are also confronted with the well-known problem that during good times, large banks work as 
European institutions but in bad times fall on national shoulders. Ensuring a well-functioning EMU 
implies strengthening banking supervision and resolution at European level.’  
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the decision was left for the body’s regular June meeting.21 The concept of an 
‘integrated financial framework’ was then fleshed out and identified as one of ‘four 
essential building blocks’ for the future EMU in the report entitled ‘Towards a 
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, which the Union’s ‘four presidents’ 
(that is, the European Council’s own President Van Rompuy, in collaboration with 
the Presidents of the Commission Barroso, of the Eurogroup Juncker and of the 
ECB Draghi) submitted jointly to the European Council.22 For the first time, the 
official European position appeared to recognize, albeit reluctantly, that the euro 
area’s crisis is not confined to the fiscal plight of certain countries in the region, 
but is the product of a more complex pathology, the elements of which interact 
and reinforce one another.  
On this basis, the European political leadership endorsed in principle the 
Banking Union project on 29 June 2012.23 In particular, the leaders of the euro 
area’s member states now declared that ‘it is imperative to break the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns’. For this purpose, they asked the Commission to 
‘present proposals on the basis of Article 127(6) [of the TFEU] for a single 
supervisory mechanism shortly’ and the Council to ‘consider these proposals as a 
matter of urgency by the end of 2012’.  
Revealing the true intention behind this very tight schedule, they had this to 
add: ‘When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the 
ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision have 
the possibility to recapitalize banks directly.’24 In other words, the rapid move to a 
streamlined supranational supervisory system was necessary as a prerequisite for 
the mutualization of bank recapitalization efforts. The principle whereby the 
financial liability for rescue operations or bailouts must remain at the same 
governance level where supervision is exercised, so as to preclude an 
externalization of the effects of deficient supervisory performance, was kept alive 
on German insistence. Nonetheless, the agreement of the leaders was initially 
understood as a commitment that before the end of the year, and irrespectively of 
the envisaged supervisory mechanism’ exact form, the ESM would be substituted 
to the fiscally vulnerable governments of the euro area’s periphery as paymaster of 
any further bank recapitalization efforts.25  
                                                     
21 See European Council press release, ‘Remarks by President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy Following the Informal Dinner of the Members of the European Council’, EUCO 93/12 (24 
May 2012), noting that ‘[c]olleagues expressed various opinions on issues such as eurobonds in a time 
perspective, more integrated banking supervision and resolution, and a common deposit insurance 
scheme’ – without, however, mentioning specifically President Barroso.  
22 The other three building blocks identified in the report were: an integrated budgetary framework; an 
integrated economic policy framework; and strengthened democratic legitimacy and accountability.  
23 Euro Area Summit statement, 29 June 2012; and European Council conclusions, 28‒29 June 2012, 
paras. 4 and IV(a).  
24 Euro area summit, 29 June 2012.  
25 See Nicolas Véron, ‘Europe’s Banking Union: Possible Next Steps on a Bumpy Path’, post at the 
RealTime blog of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 3 July 2012, 
http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=3004.  
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The endorsement in principle by the European Council of the Banking Union 
(as the new project came to be called almost immediately) was followed within 
weeks, first by an uncharacteristically strongly-worded commitment of the ECB 
President Mario Draghi ‘to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’,26 and then 
by the announcement by the ECB of the so-called ‘outright monetary transactions’ 
(‘OMT’) programme.27 The OMT allows, under certain conditions, the ECB to 
intervene in the secondary markets for the purpose of stabilizing the prices of a 
country’s sovereign bonds, if this country comes under extraordinary and, in the 
ECB’s view, unjustified market pressure. It should be noted in this context that, 
due to the interrelated banking and sovereign debt troubles, the supposedly single 
monetary area has effectively split into national segments, with dissimilar inflation 
trends, interest rates and credit market conditions. For instance, while the ECB’s 
policy rate is the same for all countries and all banks in the euro area, the cost of 
credit differs significantly from country to country, so that borrowers (businesses 
and households) in the peripheral countries face much steeper conditions than 
those at the center. Since 2010, interest rates on new loans in Greece or Portugal 
are immensely higher than in Germany (at 5 to 7%, as compared to 2 to 3%); the 
situation in Italy or Spain is somewhat better, but the divergence is still 
substantial.28 Against this backdrop, the ECB considered that the possibility of 
intervention in sovereign bond markets with a view to quell unwarranted and 
asymmetrical attacks on particular countries would be necessary as a means of 
‘safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of 
the monetary policy’.29 Regardless of the monetary implications, the combined 
effect of the announcement of the Banking Union and these moves by the ECB 
was enough to stem the turbulence, boost market confidence and precipitate a 
virtual spiral of declining yields for the bonds of the governments of the euro 
area’s periphery.30  
Soon, however, a number of lender countries had second thoughts about the 
use of the ESM in support of the recapitalization of banks whose failure could be 
attributed to so-called ‘legacy assets’, that is, to the crystallization of losses on 
transactions concluded prior to the move to a unified supervisory system.31 More 
generally, these countries had reservations about the mutualization of the costs of 
                                                     
26 Mario Draghi, speech at the Global Investment Conference (London, 26 July 2012): ‘Within our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be 
enough’.  
27 The OMT programme was publicly announced, following its endorsement by the ECB’s Governing 
Council, on 2 August 2012, although the technical framework was announced only a month later, on 6 
September 2012; ECB press release, ‘Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions’ (6 
September 2012).  
28 OECD, ‘Euro Area’, above, n. 113, pp. 14 and 17.  
 29 The ECB’s Governing Council reached its decision on the OMT programme over the Bundesbank’s 
objections. The validity of the decision has been challenged before the German Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) and the CJEU; BVerfG, decision of 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13; and 
CJEU, Case C-62/14 (not yet decided, opinion of AG Cruz Villalón delivered on 14 January 2015).  
30 As a result, up till now the OMT instrument has never been actually put into operation.  
31 Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, 25 September 
2012.  
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bank bailouts. Their objections had two practical consequences: first, the 
legislative process for the enactment of the key Banking Union legislation took 
longer than originally intended; and second, the final decisions on the financial 
arrangements for banking resolution kept being postponed. As discussed in detail 




3. THE CONCEPT APPLIED 
 
Still, in the two years between the Banking Union’s original endorsement by the 
European Council and the election of a new European Parliament and 
Commission in 2014, remarkable progress was achieved, with the enactment of 
framework legislation for all its major planks. By European standards, the 
legislative process was completed in a remarkably short time.  
In applied terms, the Banking Union is a streamlined and highly centralized 
regime for the supervision and resolution of all banks in the euro area and beyond, 
based on a novel, complex institutional set-up. Although it reserves specific 
operational roles for national supervisors and resolution officials, for the truly 
critical decisions it relies on supranational decision-making, especially with regard 
to the largest and most important banking institutions. Its two-pronged 
institutional construction comprises a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a 
separate Single Resolution Mechanism. Both mechanisms will apply in their 
respective fields the relevant norms of the pan-European ‘single rulebook’.32  
 
SINGLE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM (SSM) 
 
The SSM entails the creation of an integrated organizational framework for 
prudential supervision (but not of conduct-of-business and/or consumer-related 
regulation).33 It is founded on two legal instruments: a regulation on the 
                                                     
32 The single rulebook was not designed with specific reference to the challenges facing the monetary 
union. In fact, the expression clearly predates the Banking Union project; see above, n. 75 and 
accompanying text. Many of the legislative proposals covered by the term antedate even the second 
(sovereign-debt-related) phase of the crisis, and certainly did not anticipate the third, which eventually 
caused the move to a Banking Union. Nonetheless, the single rulebook was retrospectively identified as 
one of the three foundational elements of the Banking Union, alongside the SSM and the SRM. Of 
course, the single rulebook applies across the EU (as well as in the three other countries of the EEA, 
once the EEA Joint Committee amends the EEA Agreement for the purpose of extending the 
applicability of the relevant instruments to them); but specific differentiations between the euro area and 
other member states are possible on matters relating primarily to the operation of the monetary union 
and its economy, rather than the single market.  
33 See Christos Vl. Gortsos, ‘The “Single Supervisory Mechanism”: A Major Building Block towards a 
European Banking Union (The Full Europeanisation of the “Bank Safety Net”)”, ECEFIL Working Paper 
No 2013/8 (June 2013). 
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organization and procedures of the SSM itself (‘SSM Regulation’),34 establishing 
the ECB’s role as the Banking Union’s ultimate supervisory authority; and an 
accompanying instrument, which amended the legal framework of the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) for the purpose of ensuring a balance between the 
countries of the Banking Union and the non-participating member states in its 
decision-making procedures.35  
It should be noted that, while participation in the Banking Union and its SSM 
is automatic for all euro area countries, other countries may also join on a 
voluntary basis. For this purpose, they must enter into a ‘close cooperation’ 
agreement with the ECB, so as to guarantee the ECB’s legal capacity to perform 
its supervisory work in their territory and to commit these countries to make the 
ECB’s supervisor decisions binding upon their national competent authorities.36 
Such agreements can be ended either by the ECB or by the country involved.37 
Accordingly, the participation of non-euro area member states in the Banking 
Union is neither seamless nor irreversible. Although certain countries have 
expressed an interest to join on this basis, up till now none has done so.  
The new supervisory architecture is structured in two levels. The supervisory 
responsibility for the Banking Union’s most significant banks is concentrated at 
the supranational level and entrusted to the ECB.38 Generally speaking, a bank is 
considered ‘significant’, if it is one of the three largest credit institutions in its 
home member state, if the volume of its assets is larger than 20% of the home 
member state’s GDP, or if the volume of its assets is over € 30 billion.39 On these 
criteria, 120 banks across the euro area have been classified as ‘significant’.40 
Following a comprehensive assessment of their financial condition, to ensure that 
the transition would not entail the grandfathering of previously unidentified legacy 
problems into the new regime,41 the responsibility for the direct supervision of 
                                                     
34 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
OJ 2013 No. L287/63. 
35 Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 
amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to 
Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013, OJ 2013 No. L287/5. 
36 SSM Regulation, art. 7.  
37 SSM Regulation, art. 7(6), (8)‒(9). 
38 For this reason, the SSM Regulation has not been enacted as an instrument of market harmonization 
based on the general provision of TFEU, art. 114, but on the narrow basis of the provision which allows 
the assignment to the ECB of ‘specific tasks [...] concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision 
of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings’; 
TFEU, art. 127(6); and Statute of the ESCB, art. 25.2.  
39 SSM Regulation, art. 6(4).  
40 ECB, ‘The List of Significant Supervised Entities and the List of Less Significant Institutions’ (04 
September 2014).  
41 Conducted between November 2013 and October 2014 in preparation for the assumption by the ECB 
of supervisory functions within the SSM, the comprehensive assessment was based on the SSM 
Regulation, art. 33.4. It covered all banks to be directly supervised by the ECB – that is, 130 banks in 18 
countries, controlling between themselves around 82% of the euro area’s total bank assets. The 
assessment had three elements: a supervisory risk assessment, covering key risks in banks’ balance sheets, 
including liquidity, leverage, and funding; an asset quality review, focusing on a close scrutiny of all asset 
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these banks passed from the competent authorities of the home countries to the 
ECB on 4 November 2014, at which point the SSM became fully operational. 
The front-line supervision of less important banks remains in the hands of 
the national competent authorities; but the ECB is responsible for the 
authorization and vetting of the major shareholders of these institutions too, and it 
retains powers of intervention, which enable it to assume direct supervisory 
responsibility for any particular bank. 
To preserve the integrity of monetary and supervisory decision-making and to 
safeguard the functional independence of monetary policy-making, within the 
ECB supervisory tasks are carried on separately from the monetary functions by a 
specialist bureaucracy.42 The overall responsibility for planning and execution 
belongs to a newly-formed internal body, the Supervisory Board, which is 
composed by a Chair, a Vice Chair, four representatives of the ECB who must not 
be involved with monetary-policy tasks, and one representative from each national 
competent authority.43 Decisions in the Supervisory Board are taken by simple 
majority of the members.44 As the ECB’s statute reserves the ultimate decision-
making power for the Governing Council, the Supervisory Board cannot take 
itself the final decisions relating to the authorization of credit institutions or the 
imposition of sanctions. Instead, the Supervisory Board prepares and submits full 
draft decisions which the Governing Council can adopt or reject, giving reasons in 
writing, but not amend; the draft decisions are deemed to have adopted, unless it 
objects within a specified period of time, which cannot exceed ten working days.45 
In case of objection, the SSM Regulation provides for a referral of the matter to a 
Mediation Panel.46  
 
SINGLE RESOLUTION MECHANISM (SRM) 
 
The responsibility of the ECB extends to the adoption of appropriate measures, 
when a bank has crossed the triggers for early intervention.47 When, however, a 
bank is found to be failing, its resolution will in the future be carried out by the 
Banking Union’s second mechanism, the SRM.48 The SRM includes common 
decision-making procedures for bank resolution, supported by common financial 
arrangements in the form of a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) (but not by common 
deposit guarantee arrangements, since the system of separate national DGSs 
                                                                                                                                       
categories; and a stress test of banks’ balance sheets as of 31 December 2013, which was intended to 
provide a forward-looking view of banks’ shock-absorption capacity under stress. ECB press release, 
‘ECB Starts Comprehensive Assessment in Advance of Supervisory Role’ (23 October 2013).   
42 SSM Regulation, art. 25. 
43 SSM Regulation, art. 26(1), (5). 
44 SSM Regulation, art. 26(6). 
45 SSM Regulation, art. 26(8).  
46 SSM Regulation, art. 25(5).  
47 BRRD, arts. 27–30; and SRM Regulation, art. 13. 
48 For a concise description, see Commission memo, ‘A Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking 
Union – Frequently Asked Questions’, MEMO/14/295 (15 April 2014). 
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continues). The operation of the SRM is based on a regulation establishing a 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) as the central resolution authority and setting out 
the decision-making procedures for resolution (‘SRM Regulation’).49 A separate 
intergovernmental agreement (‘IGA on the SRF’),50 reached outside the Treaty 
framework, regulates the pooling in the SRF of contributions raised from banks at 
the national level.  
Unlike the SSM, the SRM is not yet operational. Certain provisions of the 
SRM Regulation are already effective, so as to enable the formation of the SRB 
and the commencement of the SRM’s preparatory work (that is, resolution 
planning in relation to individual banks and banking groups); but the actual power 
to resolve banks will only pass to the SRM on 1 January 201651 ‒ always assuming 
that the IGA on the SRF will have entered into force by then.52  
The SRM will cover automatically all banks establish in the countries of the 
Banking Union, including non-euro area countries which have joined by way of a 
‘close cooperation’ agreement.53 Within the SRM, the SRB will be directly 
responsible for resolution planning in relation to the banks which are supervised 
directly by the ECB, while the national resolution authorities will assist the SRB in 
this task and will also be primarily responsible for smaller banks.54 The main 
resolution decisions in relation to ECB-supervised banks, as well as to those 
domestically supervised institutions whose resolution necessitates the use of the 
SRF, will be taken by the SRB.55 But the actual execution of the resolution scheme 
is left to the national resolution authorities; the latter will apply the requisite 
measures in accordance to their domestic company and insolvency law.56 In all 
cases, the actions of the national resolution authorities will be subject to the SRB’s 
powers of intervention.57  
The SRB consists of a Chair, four permanent members, and representatives 
of the national resolution authorities of all participating countries, with 
                                                     
49 Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, OJ 2014 No. L225/1. Unlike the SSM Regulation, this one is 
adopted as a single-market measure on the basis of TFEU, art. 114. The appropriateness and sufficiency 
of this legal basis is questionable, especially in so far as the conferral of decision-making tasks to the SRB 
(a new body, whose operation is not provided for in the Treaties) is concerned; cf. ECJ, Case 9/56, 
Meroni [1957/1958] ECR 133.  
50 Agreement on the transfer and mutualization of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. The 
agreement was signed by 26 member states (that is, all except Sweden and the UK) on 21 May 2014. See 
also SRM Regulation, art. 1, third para. 
51 SRM Regulation, art. 99(2)‒(5).  
52 The IGA on the SRF is intended to apply from 1 January 2016, simultaneously with the main 
provisions of the SRM Regulation; but, to come into effect, it requires ratification by countries 
representing 90% of the weighted vote of the member states participating in the Banking Union. As at 
end 2014, only one country (Latvia) had completed the ratification process. 
53 SRM Regulation, arts. 2 and 4.  
54 SRM Regulation, arts. 5(1) and 7‒9.  
55 SRM Regulation, arts. 7(2)‒(3), 16 and 18.  
56 SRM Regulation, arts. 18(9) and 28‒29.  
57 SRM Regulation, art. 28(2) and 31.  
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representatives of the ECB and the Commission participating in its procedures as 
permanent observers.58 It must be noted, however, that the SRB considers 
individual cases either in a plenary session or in a truncated formation, the so-
called ‘executive session’, which includes only the Chair, the four permanent 
members and those national representatives who represent countries where the 
bank under consideration has a presence (headquarters, branches and/or 
subsidiaries).59 Resolution decisions are taken in executive session, except when 
the resolution scheme provides for support by the SRF in excess of € 5 billion or 
when the the net accumulated use of the Fund in the last consecutive 12 months 
has exceeded the threshold of € 5 billion.60  
The resolution procedure is complex, but exceptionally expeditious.61 In 
particular, upon notification from the ECB of a bank’s actual or impending failure 
or on its own initiative, the SRB assesses the bank’s condition and draws the 
resolution scheme, specifying the appropriate resolution tools and financing 
arrangements, including the extent to which the SRF may be used.62 To take 
effect, the resolution scheme proposed by the SRB requires the approval of the 
Commission or, when the Commission refers the matter to it, of the Council.63 In 
case of objection by either of them, the SRB must reconsider the situation and 
amend the resolution scheme in accordance with the reasons given for the 
objection.64 The various procedural steps must take place within very tight time 
limits, ensuring the completion of the whole procedure within no more than 32 
hours – the length of the proverbial weekend.65  
In the present text, it is not possible to delve into all aspects of the set-up and 
procedure of the SRM. However, the question of resolution financing must be 
addressed, given that financing considerations were paramount in the decision to 
move to a Banking Union. As we will see, the interaction of the BRRD’s principal 
legal policy, which is to ensure that henceforth the taxpayer’s part in the resolution 
burden-sharing will be confined to the bare minimum, with the political wrangling 
relating to the mutualization of resolution financing, has transformed subtly but 





                                                     
58 SRM Regulation, art. 43.  
59 SRM Regulation, arts. 49 and 53.  
60 SRM Regulation, arts. 50(1)(c)‒(d) and 54(1)(b).  
61 SRM Regulation, art. 18.  
62 SRM Regulation, art. 18 (1), (6).  
63 SRM Regulation, art. 18(7).  
64 SRM Regulation, art. 18(7), sixth and seventh subparas.  
65 SRM Regulation, art. 18(7).  
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4. THE NEED FOR A COMMON ‘FISCAL BACKSTOP’ AS RAISON 
D'ÊTRE OF THE MOVE TO A BANKING UNION 
 
The whole point of the Banking Union was to sever the perverse loop between 
bank failure and sovereign debt distress by mutualizing the fiscal costs of bank 
resolution. The establishment of a joint public funding mechanism with 
particularly deep pockets – a so-called common ‘fiscal backstop’ – for the whole 
euro area, was considered essential for this purpose. Such a mechanism could 
simultaneously relieve the budgetary pressure on the governments of the periphery 
and provide a way out of their local banking crises: the risk that an impaired 
banking system may require a publicly financed bailout would no longer dominate 
the assessment of a country’s fiscal sustainability; at the same time, the credibility 
of bank restructuring efforts would be tremendously enhanced by the inclusion of 
supranational financing arrangements.  
The centralized funding of recapitalizations would further imply an 
equalization of the bailout prospects for banks located anywhere in the euro area. 
This would eliminate an important source of national distinctiveness in the 
banking system. In the wake of the Lehman Brothers debacle, the euro area’s 
governments had made a solemn collective promise to support the European 
banking system during ‘the current exceptional circumstances’, including by 
preventing the failure of banks in the region and ensuring their recapitalization 
with state funds, if necessary.66 The ensuing bank rescue programmes were 
undertaken by the national governments severally. However, not all governments 
were equally well placed to guarantee in a credible manner the survival of their 
domestic banks. The financial strength of the relevant member state thus came to 
dominate the market’s assessments of relative bank riskiness. This was a key factor 
in the disruption of cross-border lending. It was aggravated by the behaviour of 
certain national banking authorities, which sought to ensure the national ring-
fencing of available liquidity by discouraging cross-border refinancing even 
between entities within the same banking group. The ensuing fragmentation along 
national lines of banking and monetary conditions (which, theoretically, should be 
completely unified in a monetary union) has since been a major drag on the 
recovery efforts of the peripheral economies. In view of the above, the 
mutualization of the fiscal responsibility for bank rescue operations would be a 
major step towards the reversal of the situation, the convergence of monetary 
conditions and the reintegration of the credit allocation mechanism, thus 
contributing to the attainment of the objectives of both the Single Market and the 
EMU.  
Such were the considerations which drove the European leaders on 29 June 
2012 to explicitly affirm the need to break the ‘vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns’, adding that ‘[w]hen an effective single supervisory mechanism is 
                                                     
66 Summit of the Euro Area Countries, ‘Declaration on a Concerted European Action Plan of the Euro 
Area Countries’ (12 October 2008).  
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established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, 
following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly’.67 At 
this point it is worth repeating that the ESM, the euro area’s intergovernmental 
financial assistance mechanism, was created specifically as a tool for the 
management of sovereign debt crises, not financial ones; thus, in its original 
configuration, it could only support a banking-sector-orientated programme 
indirectly,68 by extending a loan to the relevant national government, which could 
then apply the borrowed funds on its own account to the necessary bank 
recapitalization actions (‘indirect bank recapitalization’ by the ESM).69 When 
assistance is provided in this manner, however, the borrowed funds increase 
immediately the recipient country’s public debt. In contrast, the direct 
recapitalization of banks by the ESM would leave a country’s fiscal situation 
unaffected. Expanding the ESM’s role in this direction, then, was the key premise 
of the original decision to move to a Banking Union. The leaders effectively 
sanctioned the development of a supranational financing instrument –the hoped-
for common fiscal backstop– for the recapitalization of weak banks, thus 
alleviating the pressure on national budgets. The decision to centralize the banking 
supervisory function was a by-product of this development. Without supranational 
supervision, the existence of an external (supranational) financial guarantee would 
generate moral hazard: national governments and competent authorities would 
now be more likely to adopt a lenient supervisory stance, since this would help the 
national banking sector gain market share in the internal market, while the 
downside risk of having to pay for a bailout would be shared with the other 
economies. For this reason, the responsibility for supervision should be moved to 
the same level, where the public safety-net would now be located.  
In the course of constructing the Banking Union, however, something 
remarkable happened: the centralization of supervision was carried out decisively; 
but in the meantime its actual premise (that is, the centralization of the fiscal 
backstop for bank resolution) was all but abandoned.70  
Almost from the start, the negotiations on the set-up of the Banking Union’s 
two mechanisms were marked by divergent interpretations of the final objectives. 
                                                     
67 Euro Area Summit statement, 29 June 2012. See also European Council conclusions, 28‒29 June 2012, 
para. IV(a), ‘welcoming’ the statement of the Euro Area Summit; and European Council conclusions, 13-
14 December 2012, para. 10.  
68 In particular, on the basis of the ESM Treaty, art. 15; and ESM, ‘Guideline on Financial Assistance for 
the Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions’.  
69 This is how the EFSF/ESM financed Spain’s bank recapitalization efforts in 2012. As agreed in July 
2012, the programme was for an 18-month period and involved financing of up to € 100 billion, but in 
the event Spain only drew some € 41.4 billion. See Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement 
between European Financial Stability Facility, Kingdom of Spain as Beneficiary Member State, Fondo de 
Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria as Guarantor and the Bank of Spain (24 July 2012). The EFSF 
facility was assumed by the ESM on 28 November 2012.  
70 Silvia Merler, ‘Comfortably Numb: ESM Direct Recapitalization – Too Late to Solve the Current 
Crisis, Too Little to Deter Future Crises’, Bruegel.org, 24th June 2014, 
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1369-comfortably-numb-esm-direct-recapitalization.  
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At the height of the euro area’s crisis, Germany and its closest allies in the debate, 
the Netherlands and Finland, had been forced to acquiesce in principle to a 
common fiscal backstop. Subsequently, however, they took advantage of the crisis’ 
relative abatement to qualify the original decision. For them, the retention of an 
effective national veto over the use of financial resources was a key priority. To 
avoid a loss of control, they resisted strongly the most robust forms of 
centralization of bank resolution, and even supervision. In particular, they drew 
the line on the issue of so-called ‘legacy assets’: who should bear the costs of 
recapitalization for banks who fail as a result of losses on pre-existing bad assets? 
The three countries were adamant that the ESM should never take direct 
responsibility in cases of this type,71 since this would amount to an ex post facto 
mutualization of the costs from past national supervisory failures. If so, however, 
the availability of the common fiscal backstop in the foreseeable future –and, 
accordingly, its usefulness as a way out of the ongoing crisis– would be practically 
nil. Their insistence on comprehensive supervisory stock-taking and cleaning up 
prior to the establishment of the common fiscal backstop was essentially the 
reverse of what the Commission, the ECB and the countries of the euro area’s 
periphery were trying to achieve in the short run. Equally, with regard to the long-
run steady state, the need for national approvals as a precondition for the direct 
recapitalization of banks by the ESM undermines the basic rationale of the original 
scheme, which was to equalize the conditions of operation of banking systems 
across the euro area by providing a permanent and convincing (both in terms of 
size and conditions of activation) fiscal backstop, whose intervention would not 
depend on political wrangling or national considerations.  
Under the pressure of the most powerful lender countries, the negotiations 
soon led to a reconceptualization of the Banking Union project. Indeed, the 
member states and the Union institutions managed to converge on the 
institutional and procedural organization of the Banking Union’s two mechanisms 
in record time; but agreement was feasible only because key questions relating to 
the SRM’s promised common fiscal backstop were left open, whereas the 
legislation included prescriptive norms specifically aimed at ensuring that (a) the 
use of public funds in bank resolution would be avoided under all but the most 
pressing circumstances, and even then kept to a minimum, through an application 
of a strict bail-in approach, and (b) the primary fiscal responsibility for resolution 
would remain at the national level, with the mutualized fiscal backstop serving as 
an absolutely last resort.  
Specifically, the possibility of direct recapitalization of banks by the ESM was 
a common theme of the initial European Council pronouncements on the 
Banking Union.72 It soon became apparent, however, that in the future the 
recapitalization of banks with fiscal resources – the primary form of state 
                                                     
71 ‘Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland’ (25 September 
2012).  
72 Euro Area Summit statement, 29 June 2012; European Council conclusions, 18‒19 October 2012, 
para. 12; European Council conclusions, 13‒14 December 2012, para. 10–11.  
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intervention during the Global Financial Crisis ‒ would be the exception rather 
than the rule. A critical step in this direction was taken in June 2013, with the 
conclusion of the negotiations on the Council’s general approach to the draft 
BRRD,73 which was paralleled by an agreement in the Eurogroup on the main 
features of the ESM’s future ‘direct recapitalization instrument’ (‘DRI’).74 The 
financial framework for resolution was further clarified in December 2013, when a 
final, successful round of inter-institutional negotiations on the relevant provisions 
of the BRRD and the DGSD75 was immediately followed by a compromise 
between member states in the Ecofin on the draft SRM Regulation and the basic 
parameters of the Single Resolution Fund.76 The detailed provisions of operation 
of the latter were specified a few months later, when the IGA on the SRF was 
signed. This coincided with the final enactment of the key legislative texts on bank 
resolution (SRM Regulation, BRRD, DGSD), which further entrenched the new 
policies. The technical picture was completed in May-June 2014, with the drafting 
of internal ESM rules for the operation of the DRI,77 which the Eurogroup 
endorsed by way of a ‘political understanding’ on the matter.78 This paved the way 
for the DRI’s final inclusion in the toolkit of ESM financial assistance instruments 
on 8 December 2014 (a month after the full activation of the SSM).79  
The policy choices made on these occasions locked in a requirement of 
extensive bail-in of private stakeholders and the avoidance of public assistance in 
all but the most extreme circumstances as principal characteristics of the 
European approach to bank resolution. To ensure a uniform resolution regime 
across the wider internal market, care was taken to ensure that the operation of the 
Banking Union’s SRM will be compatible with the pan-European framework 
established by the BRRD. The principles and rules in the latter also apply to the 
                                                     
73 Ecofin conclusions, 27 June 2013. 
74 ‘ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument – Main Features of the Operational Framework and 
Way Forward’ (20 June 2013). 
75 Lithuanian Presidency press release, ‘Lithuanian Presidency Reaches Political Agreement on Bank 
Bailout Rules’ (12 December 2013). The release emphasizes that ‘[the BRRD] is dedicated to save tax 
payers money. It was agreed to have strict bail-in rules, which would ensure less moral hazard in the 
financial system and protection of tax payers’ interests in financial crisis situations.’ See now BRRD, rec. 
(103), third sentence, and (109), first sentence.  
76 Ecofin conclusions, 18 December 2013; and ‘Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on the 
SRM Backstop’ (18 December 2013). See also European Council conclusions, 19-20 December 2013, 
para 29.  
77 ESM, ‘Draft Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions’ (23 May 
2014).  
78 Eurogroup President statement, ‘ESM Direct Recapitalisation Instrument’ (10 June 2014); and ESM, 
‘FAQ on the Preliminary Agreement on the Future ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument’ (10 
June 2014).  
79 ESM Board of Governors Resolution No. 4 of 8 December 2014 (SG/BoG/2014/05/04). While the 
five original financing instruments of the ESM are enumerated in the ESM Treaty, art. 14–18, this was 
introduced by way of a unanimous resolution of the ESM Board of Governors (that is, the finance 
ministers of the countries of the euro area, chaired by the Eurogroup President) based on the reserve 
provision of art. 19.  
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SRM – albeit subject to certain modifications, necessitated by its supranational 




5. THE BRRD’S BURDEN-SHARING CASCADE AND ITS  IMPACT 
ON RESOLUTION FINANCING IN THE BANKING UNION 
 
As a result, the potential application of ESM resources for resolution purposes 
was essentially amalgamated in the BRRD’s structured and prescriptive approach 
to resolution financing, whereby a specific and rather inflexible (at least in 
principle) burden-sharing cascade must be allowed to run its course, before public 
resources can be used to bailout a bank. This has momentous implications for the 
Banking Union’s prospective fiscal backstop. The final approach sets strict limits 
on the utilization of the ESM and, in particular, raises significant barriers to the 
activation of the DRI.  
 
THE BURDEN-SHARING CASCADE 
 
Specifically, according to the relevant legislative texts: 
  
 Whenever a bank fails, the possibility of liquidation (a procedure which does 
not raise external financing issue) must first be considered. In particular, 
reiterating the principles of the BRRD, the legislation establishing the SRM 
emphasizes the ‘exceptional’ character of resolution actions: an insolvent 
bank should normally be wound up by way of normal insolvency 
proceedings; it should be maintained as a going concern through the exercise 
of resolution powers and the application of resolution tools only if this 
appears advisable for financial stability purposes.81  
 Even when piecemeal liquidation (winding up) is inadvisable for reasons of 
systemic stability, a failed bank’s resolution as a going-concern (whether as a 
whole or in part, and whether by retaining the old legal entity, through a 
merger with another entity or through a bridge bank) must be financed to the 
extent possible from private sources, both internal (existing stakeholders of 
the bank) and external (willing acquirers and/or investors of new capital).  
 In particular, existing stakeholders – namely, shareholders, junior creditors 
and, depending on the circumstances, even senior creditors and depositors 
with deposits in excess of the guaranteed amount of € 100,000 – are required 
to contribute to the absorption of losses and recapitalization of the bank 
                                                     
80 SRM Regulation, rec. (18). The delegated acts and the regulatory and implementing technical standards, 
guidelines and recommendations issued in pursuance of the BRRD are equally binding on the decision-
making bodies of the SRM as on the resolution authorities of member states outside the Banking Union.  
81 SRM Regulation, rec. (59); and BRRD, rec. (45)-(46).  
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through a write down of their equity and debt claims and/or the conversion 
of debt claims into equity (application of the so-called ‘bail-in tool’). The 
extent of write-down or conversion of claims will depend on the 
circumstances, but for each category of creditor included in the bail-in an 
upper limit is set by the principle that ‘no creditor worse off than under 
normal insolvency proceedings’.82 In order to minimize the impact of bail-in 
in the event of their resolution, banks might be tempted to reconfigure their 
liability structure and avoid issuing eligible liabilities. To ensure that this will 
not happen, the legislation on the SRM,83 reflecting once more the relevant 
provisions of the BRRD,84 enables the SRB to impose on individual 
institutions a mandatory minimum requirement (‘MREL’) for own funds and 
other liabilities amenable to bail-in (‘eligible liabilities’).85  
 In this context, the relevant national DGS (a mechanism funded through 
levies on the banking industry, thus also a ‘private’ source in a restricted 
sense) may be required contribute to the financing of a member bank’s 
resolution. However, its participation to open-bank resolution financing is 
limited to the amounts that it would be required to pay out to covered 
depositors, if the bank in question had been would up under normal 
insolvency proceedings.86 Thus, the ‘no worse off’ principle applies to the 
DGS’s participation in similar manner as to creditors whose claims are 
included in the bail-in. Since losses from payments to covered depositors 
cannot logically occur unless the bank has negative net worth, the DGS 
responsibility may never go beyond bringing a bank’s net worth back to zero. 
In other words, the DGS should only be asked to make a contribution in 
order to cover a net shortfall of assets over liabilities, but not to support with 
positive capital resources the failed bank or a bridge bank.87  
 If the contributions of private parties are not enough,88 the appropriate 
national resolution fund or, for the countries of the Banking Union and from 
1 January 2016 onwards, the SRM’s SRF (once more, a mechanism which is 
funded by the banking industry, therefore from a financing perspective as 
‘private’ as the DGS) can make a contribution, subject to strict conditions and 
up to a specific limit. Thus, the relevant resolution fund can only step in after 
a contribution amounting to no less than 8% of total liabilities (that is, 
                                                     
82 BRRD, rec. (5) and (73) and arts. 34(1)(g) and 74–75; SRM Regulation, rec. (78) and arts. 15(1)(g) and 
20(5), (9).  
83 SRM Regulation, rec. (83)-(84) and art. 3(1)(49), 7(3)(d), 8(9)(o) and 12.  
84 BRRD, rec. (79)-(80) and art. 45.  
85 See also EBA, ‘Consultation Paper: Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on Criteria for Determining 
the Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities under Directive 2014/59/EU’ 
(EBA/CP/2014/41, 28 November 2014). 
86 SRM Regulation, rec. (81) and (110) and art. 79; BRRD, rec. (71) and art. 109. 
87 BRRD, rec. (110) and art. 109(1). Note that covered deposits now enjoy a higher priority ranking 
compared to other unsecured claims, thus reducing the availability of DGS contributions even for loss 
absorbency purposes; BRRD, rec. (111) and art. 108.  
88 SRM Regulation, (101), fourth and fifth sentence.  
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liabilities including own funds) has been made by stakeholders other than 
covered depositors by way of bail-in.89 In addition, the intervention is limited 
to medium-term financing of no more than 5% of total liabilities.90  
 If a bank remains undercapitalized even after all the aforementioned sources 
of resolution financing have been exhausted (either because they were 
depleted, or because the limits on their contribution were reached), but its 
continuation as a going concern appears imperative for reasons of systemic 
stability, recapitalization with public funds (whether national or pan-
European) may be considered. In these circumstances, the provision by the 
SRF of assistance in excess of the 5% limit is possible, but only if all 
unsecured, non-preferred liabilities, other than eligible deposits, have been 
written down or converted in full.91 
 
While in the European resolution system the official decision-makers have 
discretion to select the most appropriate method of resolution and to apply any of 
the resolution tools set out in the BRRD, there is no discretion as to the 
application of the BRRD’s burden-sharing cascade. This also applies to the 
resolution actions of the SRM.92 Assuming that the standing policy decisions and 
legal prescriptions will be applied faithfully ex post, especially at a time of crisis, the 
cascade shifts the bulk of the burden from the taxpayer to the banks themselves, 




Thus, the private sector (that is, the bank’s immediate stakeholders by way of bail-
in, but also the broader banking industry through the relevant resolution fund) 
must finance the bailout to the tune of at least 13% of the failed bank’s total 
liabilities, before public funds are used.93  
Crucially, the principle of strict insistence on bail-in for all claimants other 
than covered depositors can be relaxed to a very substantial extent ex post, because 
both the BRRD and the SRM Regulation confer to the resolution authorities a 
discretion to exclude, for a variety of reasons, a wide range of creditors from the 
effects of bail in:  
 
                                                     
89 BRRD, rec. (57), (73) and (75), and arts. 37(10)(a), 44(5)(a) and 44(8)(a); SRM Regulation, rec. (78) and 
(80) and art. 27(7)(a). The 8% minimum ratio cannot include reductions in own funds reflecting historical 
losses, if these had been made prior to the bank’s valuation for the purposes of the resolution process; 
SRM Regulation, (80).  
90 BRRD, rec. (73)–(74), and arts. 44(5)(b) and 44(7); and SRM Regulation, rec. (78) and art. 27(7)(b).  
91 SRM Regulation, art. 27(9)–(10). 
92 Moreover, the legislation sets a criterion for the decision-makers’ choice of method: in principle, they 
should select the resolution scheme that is the least costly for the SRF; SRM Regulation, rec. (85).  
93 The justification is that ‘[i]t should be the financial industry, as a whole, that finances the stabilisation 
of the financial system’; BRRD, rec. (103), third sentence; and, in identical terms, SRM Regulation, rec. 
(100), third sentence.  
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It should be possible to exclude or partially exclude liabilities in a number of 
circumstances, including where it is not possible to bail-in such liabilities 
within a reasonable timeframe, where the exclusion is strictly necessary and is 
proportionate to achieving the continuity of critical functions and core 
business lines, or where the application of the bail-in tool to liabilities would 
cause a destruction in value such that losses borne by other creditors would 
be higher than if those liabilities were not excluded from bail-in. It should 
also be possible to exclude or partially exclude liabilities where necessary to 
avoid the spreading of contagion and financial instability which may cause 
serious disturbance to the economy of a Member State. [...] [Moreover,] 
authorities should give consideration to the consequences of a potential bail-
in of liabilities stemming from eligible deposits held by natural persons and 
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level provided 
for in Directive 2014/49/EU.94  
 
Leaving aside questions relating to the sufficiency of DGSs’ pre-funded 
resources,95 the reason for which even a well-funded DGS’s intervention may not 
be sufficient lies precisely in the existence of secured claims, which are excluded 
automatically, together with the possible extension of the safety net beyond 
covered deposits, through the discretionary creation of additional classes of 
protected creditors.96 This necessitates the introduction of arrangements for 
additional external financial support, either in the form of the industry-funded 
resolution funds or, in extremis, by way of public assistance and/or use of the 
common fiscal backstop.  
 
SINGLE RESOLUTION FUND (SRF) 
 
While in the Banking Union the DGSs will remain national, a common resolution 
fund will be established. The official justification for the SRF maintains that this is 
                                                     
94 SRM Regulation, rec. (77).  
95 By 3 July 2014, the available financial means of each DGS must have reached a target level of at least 
0.8% of its members’ total covered deposits; DGSD, art. 10(2), first subpara.  
96 The impact assessment accompanying the Commission proposal for the BRRD puts the covered 
deposits of an average European bank at around 20% of total liabilities; Commission Staff Working 
Document  SWD(2012) 166/3, p. 131 (Table 5). The same source estimates the share of non-bail-inable 
items (covered deposits and other non-bail-inable debts) in banks’ total liabilities based on two policy 
options: comprehensive bail-in, in which unsecured debt, uncovered deposits and unsecured interbank 
exposures with more than 1 month original maturity are subject to bail-in; and restricted bail-in, in which 
only unsecured long term debt and uncovered deposits with more than 1 year original maturity are 
included. According to this estimation, an average European bank’s non-bail-inable liabilities amount 
from 61.5% to 78.6% of total liabilities, depending on the policy option chosen. For an average large 
banking group, the share is even higher, at a range from 69.7% to 86.7%. ibid., pp. 130‒1 and 133 (Table 
6). It should be noted that the exact volume of banks’ covered deposits is not known, but Daniel Gros 
and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘European Deposit Insurance and Resolution in the Banking Union’, (2014) 52 
Journal of Common Market Studies 529, 540, give a rough estimate of about €5,980 billion for all euro area 
banks.  
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essential for the attainment of the Banking Union’s two key objectives, namely, 
the breaking of the perverse link between sovereigns and the banking sector and 
the equalization across countries of banks’ bailout prospects, without which a 
bank’s place of establishment comes to dominate its borrowing conditions.97 
Strictly speaking, for these objectives to be met, it would be sufficient to provide 
equal access for all banks in the region to a credible cross-national fiscal backstop. 
Moreover, the choice in favor of a single resolution fund is hardly compatible with 
the continuing separation of the DGSs. On the other hand, there is no question 
that the integration of industry-based financing arrangements contributes to the 
credibility of the resolution system, because it makes available in respect of any 
particular resolution action an amount of pre-funded resources that exceeds by far 
what could be collected by way of bank contributions at the national level. In this 
manner, the SRF provides significant reassurance that the BRRD’s insistence on a 
sizeable contribution by the private banking sector as a prior condition for 
publicly-financed bailouts will be respected in practice, even in relation to large 
banks.  
The SRF will be pre-funded with bank contributions, which will be raised at 
the national level but pooled at Banking Union level. As mentioned above, a 
separate intergovernmental agreement establishes the modalities for the transfer of 
the national contributions to the SRF and the conditions for their progressive 
merger in a single pool.98 Contributions from individual banks must be raised ex 
ante, in order to reach a specified target level of pre-funding, which is intended to 
ensure that a critical mass of resources will be available under any circumstances 
and avoid the procyclical, destabilizing effects of an ex-post levy on other banks, 
especially in situations of systemic crisis.99 The target level for the SRF’s 
prefunded financial means has been set at no less than 1% of the deposit-
guarantee-covered deposits of all banks authorized in the Banking Union.100 It 
must be reached gradually over a period of eight years, starting from 1 January 
2016; the period may be extended by up to four more years, if the SRF has made 
cumulative disbursements of more than 0.5% of covered deposits, that is, more 
than half the target level.101 Thereafter, if the SRF’s financial means fall below the 
                                                     
97 SRM Regulation, rec. (19), second sentence, and (100), second sentence. 
98 IGA on the SRF.  
99 SRM Regulation, rec. (102)‒(104) and art. 70; this is consistent with the target level for national 
resolution funds in the BRRD, art. 102(1). In addition to a flat, pro-rata component based on relative 
size, the contributions of individual institutions may also include a component adjusted in accordance to 
their risk profile, so as to ensure fairness in the allocation of the financial burden and provide incentives 
for less risky behavior; SRM Regulation, rec. (109) and art. 70(2), (6); BRRD, rec. (107) and art 103(7).  
100 SRM Regulation, rec. (105) and art. 69(1), in conjunction with art. 3(1)(11) and DGSD, arts. 
2(1)(3)‒(5), 5 and 6. In the future, the target may be redefined to substitute total liabilities for covered 
deposits as the basis for the calculation and/or to establish a minimum absolute amount of prefunding; 
SRM Regulation, rec. (105) and art. 94(1)(a)(vi).  
101 SRM Regulation, rec. (106) and art. 69(1) and (3). Thus, the intended period for the built-up of the 
SRF ends a year before the equivalent period for the national resolution funds of the member states 
outside the Banking Union, which ends on 31 December 2024; BRRD, art. 102(1)‒(2).   
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target, they must be replenished through additional regular contributions.102 
Contributions can also be imposed on an extraordinary basis and up to a limit ex 
post, if the prefunded resources prove insufficient to cover the cost of resolution 
actions of the SRM.103 In addition, if the ex ante and ex post contributions are not 
immediately accessible or are insufficient for the SRF’s intended intervention, the 
legislation enables the SRF to borrow additional sums and/or enter into other 
contractual arrangements for the purpose of attracting third-party financial 
support.104  
The resources of the SRF must be used exclusively for the implementation of 
resolution tools and resolution powers.105 More precisely, the SRF can provide 
extend short-term funding to a failed bank or a bridge entity, provide guarantees 
to potential purchasers of a failed bank or inject capital in a bridge entity; but it 
may not be used directly to absorb losses of the failed bank or to recapitalize it.106 
Any decisions on the use of the SRF will be taken centrally by the SRM’s decision-
makers. (This should be contrasted with decisions to provide public financial 
support to banks in resolution, which due to their fiscal nature are reserved for the 
national governments acting separately or, if the single fiscal backstop must be 
activated, jointly in the ESM.107) Significantly, although the SRF resources are 
drawn from the private banking sector, not the taxpayer, any resolution action 
involving SRF financing can only be undertaken with the approval of the 
Commission, exactly as if it were a form of state aid.108 The decision of the 
Commission approving the SRF aid may impose, inter alia, conditions regarding 
the recipient bank, including burden-sharing requirements, restrictions on the 
payment of dividends or on capital management transactions, prohibitions on 
group expansion or aggressive commercial strategies, requirements concerning 
market shares, pricing or product features, requirements for restructuring plans, 
                                                     
102 The resources raised in this manner must be invested in safe, diversified and liquid assets, in order to 
protect the SRF’s value and to ensure its availability; SRM Regulation, rec. (111), and art. 75.  
103 SRM Regulation, rec. (102) and art. 69‒71; see also BRRD, rec. (105)‒(107), and art. 102‒104. 
104 SRM Regulation, rec. (102) and art. 73. The legislation further permits borrowing arrangements 
between the SRF and the resolution funds of member states outside the Banking Union, as well as the 
creation of public financial facilities in favour of the SRF; SRM Regulation, arts. 72 and 74. In this 
context, the legislation envisages that prior to the date of application of the provisions on the SRF (1 
January 2016), the SRB in cooperation with the participating member states will ‘develop the appropriate 
methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity’ of the SRF; SRM 
Regulation, rec. (107), third sentence, in conjunction with art. 99(2).  
105 SRM Regulation, rec. (101).  
106 SRM Regulation, rec. (100), first sentence, and art. 76; BRRD, rec. (103), first sentence, and art. 101. 
107 SRM Regulation, rec. (19), fifth and sixth sentences, and art. 6(6) and 57(2). See also Declaration of 
the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Estonia, 
the Republic of Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Finland on the Agreement on 
the Transfer and Mutualisation of Contributions to the Single Resolution Fund made upon signature. 
108 SRM Regulation, rec. (30) and (75), third sentence, and art. 18(9), third sentence, and 19. In fact, the 
same applies even to resolution actions requiring nothing more than DGS assistance in support of a 
private solution, without use of SRF resources; SRM Regulation, rec. (47), (55).  
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governance and disclosure requirements, and even requirements relating to the 
sale or partial sale or liquidation of the recipient bank.109 
In the SRM, decisions concerning the resolution of particular banks are taken 
by the SRB in its executive session. Nonetheless, when the proposed resolution 
action involves large-scale use of SRF resources, that is, support in excess of € 5 
billion,110 any member of the SRB can request the referral of the matter to the 
plenary session.  The plenary must also review the situation and give guidance to 
the executive session when the € 5 billion threshold has been reached through a 
series of resolution actions over the previous 12-month period. The involvement 
of the plenary in these cases is explained by the need to ensure a non-
discriminatory utilization of SRF resources while avoiding its depletion.111  
Overall, the SRF is intended to provide the primary source of outside 
financing for the resolution of banks within the Banking Union. As already 
mentioned, except if all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities have been written 
down in full, its intervention will be capped by the prescribed limit of 5% of total 
liabilities. More to the point, the SRF’s potential intervention will always be subject 
to the absolute limit set by its total available resources. Thus, it is only in situations 
where the liabilities which are exempted from bail-in are substantial and the 
Fund’s contribution proves to be insufficient to cover the resulting financing gap 
that an intervention with public funds may be justified.112 As we will presently see, 
however, this does not necessarily imply an activation of the common fiscal 
backstop.  
 
THE ESM’S DIRECT RECAPITALIZATION INSTRUMENT (DRI) 
 
To be sure, once the full gamut of Banking Union arrangements becomes 
operational on 1 January 2016, the ESM’s DRI will become available for bank 
recapitalization purposes. When agreement on the instrument’s main features was 
reached in the Eurogroup in June 2013, the accompanying statement reiterated 
that the DRI’s objective was ‘to preserve the financial stability of the euro area as a 
whole and of its member states in line with Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, and to 
help remove the risk of contagion from the financial sector to the sovereign by 
allowing the recapitalization of institutions directly’.113 The way in which the 
instrument has been implemented, however, raises doubts as to its practical 
significance.  
                                                     
109 SRM Regulation, rec. (30), and art. 19(3), fifth subpara.  
110 The threshold is doubled if the support takes the form of low-risk liquidity provision, e.g. liquidity 
assistance to a solvent institutions against good collateral. 
111 SRM Regulation, rec. (33).  
112 Cf. SRM Regulation, rec. (79).  
113 ‘ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument – Main Features of the Operational Framework and 
Way Forward’ (20 June 2013).  
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In particular, the ESM DRI Guideline,114 which details the DRI’s rules of 
operation, establishes exceptionally exacting preconditions for its activation.115 
The rules raise significant barriers to the activation of the DRI even in situations 
where recapitalization with public funds appears justified and/or reduce its 
usefulness.  
Thus, assistance through the DRI is available only to banks whose 
recapitalization with public funds is considered indispensable, because they are (a) 
systemically important or otherwise likely to threaten through their failure the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole or, at least, of one or more countries 
in the area, but (b) unable (or expected to become unable in the near future) to 
meet their capital requirements, as specified by the ECB in its supervisory capacity, 
(c) unable to attract sufficient new capital from the private sector (existing 
shareholders or new market investors), and (d) unable to cover fully the estimated 
capital shortfall by way of bail-in.116  
As a result, the use of the DRI for precautionary purposes is excluded.117 
Thus, any precautionary public assistance in the form of participation in the equity 
of a bank which is still solvent will need to take place under the responsibility of 
the relevant national government and on its own account.118  
Moreover, despite the move to centralized banking supervision in the form of 
the SSM, the primary responsibility for bailing out an insolvent bank remains with 
the home member state. Accordingly, for the activation of the DRI a request for 
assistance must be submitted by an ESM member (that is, a country of the euro 
area).119 The request may be made both by countries within a macroeconomic 
adjustment programme and by non-programme countries.120 The financial 
assistance to institutions may be requested by ESM Members within or outside the 
confines of a macroeconomic adjustment programme. In all cases, however, the 
requesting country must itself be unable to provide itself the requisite financial 
assistance to the institution(s) concerned without jeopardizing its own fiscal 
sustainability or continuous access to the capital market.121  
The country eligibility criterion takes explicitly into account the alternative of 
indirect bank recapitalization by the ESM, by way of a loan to the relevant national 
                                                     
114 ESM, ‘Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions’ (8 December 
2014). See also ESM, ‘FAQ on the ESM Direct Recapitalisation Instrument’ (8 December 2014).  
115 See Bert Van Roosebeke, ‘The ESM’S Direct Recapitalisation of Banks: Looking Forward in 
Backstop-Questions’, Stiftung Ordnungspolitik, Centrum für Europäische Politik (cep), Policy Contribution 
No. 14/01 (August 2014).  
116 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 3(1).  
117 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 8(1). 
118 BRRD, rec. 41 and art. 32(4)(d)(iii); and SMR Regulation, rec. 57 and art. 18(4)(d)(iii). 
119 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 4(1).  
120 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 1(4), first sentence. With the unanimous agreement of the ESM’s members, 
the DRI may also be used ‘retroactively’, to replace in part or in full the indirect bank recapitalization 
assistance extended by the EFSF and the ESM as part of an existing country bailout programme; ESM 
DRI Guideline, art. 14.  
121 ESM DRI Guideline, arts. 2(1) and 3(2)(a).  
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government122; unless this form of assistance is bound to trigger by itself a drastic 
deterioration of the recipient country’s fiscal prospects, it should be preferred over 
the DRI. In other words, the DRI is only available in situations where a country is 
unable to finance on its own account a bailout without thereby undermining its 
fiscal prospects; in all other cases, the national government must provide itself 
financial support to the troubled bank(s),123 either by raising the requisite sums in 
the capital market or, in the worst case, by accessing the ESM for a loan.124 
Beyond the stringency of the eligibility criteria, one objection to this approach is 
that, unless it is already within a country programme, even an eligible country 
might be reluctant to apply for the activation of the DRI, because such a request 
would constitute in itself an admission of severe fiscal weakness, which could 
trigger the negative bank-sovereign spiral that it is, in theory, intended to preclude.  
The assessment of compliance with the eligibility criteria is entrusted, in 
relation to the bank concerned, to the Commission in liaison with the ESM’s 
Managing Director, the competent resolution authority and the ECB in its capacity 
as supervisor and, in relation to the requesting country, to the Commission in 
liaison with the ECB and, wherever appropriate, the IMF (that is, to the Troika of 
the post-crisis country bailout programmes). Based on this assessment, the ESM 
Board of Governors (that is, the euro area’s ministers of finance) takes a decision 
in principle to grant financial assistance.125 
Crucially, like any other assistance-granting decision of the ESM, this decision 
is reached by ‘mutual agreement’ (that is, unanimity).126 This gives an effective 
veto to each and every government in the euro area (and to each national 
parliament, which may be called to vote on the proposed ESM action). Where the 
facility is drawn in tranches, the same requirement of unanimity applies to 
decisions of the ESM Board of Directors authorizing the disbursement of the 
second and subsequent tranches.127 The ESM’s direct contribution to a bank’s 
recapitalization on this basis takes place after the writing down or conversion of 
the full amount of all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities (excluding eligible 
deposits) and the aforementioned 5% contribution of the resolution fund.128The 
maximum amount for the ESM’s contribution to a bank’s recapitalization is 
                                                     
122 ESM DRI Guideline, arts. 2(1), third sentence, and 3(2)(a), first sentence.  
123 BRRD, arts. 56‒58.  
124 ESM Treaty, art. 15.  
125 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 4(2), third sentence, and (3).  
126 ESM Treaty, art. 5(6)(f) and (g). ‘Mutual agreement’ means ‘unanimity of the members participating in 
the vote’, with abstentions excluded from consideration; ESM Treaty, art. 4(3). In emergency situations, 
where the Commission and the ECB both conclude that a failure to urgently adopt a decision regarding 
financial assistance would threaten the economic and financial sustainability of the euro area, a qualified 
majority of 85% of the votes cast is sufficient; ESM Treaty, art. 4(4), first subpara. It should be noted that 
the quorum for taking any decision in the ESM’s collective organs (Board of Governors and Board of 
Directors) is 2/3 of the members with voting rights representing at least 2/3 of the voting rights; ESM 
Treaty, art. 4(2).  
127 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 6(3). 
128 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 8(3). Slightly more lenient rules apply until 31 December 2014, whereby it is 
sufficient to achieve 8% bail-in followed by a contribution of the national resolution fund up to its 
available resources; ESM DRI Guideline, art. 8(2).  
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specified in the financial assistance facility agreement with the requesting country, 
and is based a thorough valuation, including stress testing, of the bank’s assets and 
any forthcoming contributions by private investors and the national government; 
it must be of such magnitude so as to allow the bank to fully meet the requisite 
level of capital adequacy, as determined by the ECB as supervisor.129  
Oddly, even though the DRI is supposed to provide an absolute last resort by 
preventing contagion from the financial sector to fiscally weak sovereigns,130 the 
latter are still required to contribute financially to the assistance programme – in 
fact, by taking the first hit! Thus, the requesting state is asked to make a first 
contribution to the recapitalization of the troubled bank by injecting all the capital 
that may be needed to restore the bank’s Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (that is, the 
sum of common shares and retained earnings divided to risk-weighted assets) to 
the legal minimum of 4.5%.131 In other words, the ESM will only participate in the 
recapitalization to the extent necessary to bridge the gap between the 4.5% level 
and the ECB-prescribed level of capital adequacy. Significantly, this burden-
sharing scheme is based on a robust valuation of assets, which includes their 
subjection to a sufficiently prudent stress-testing, thus further increasing the 
potential funding needs. Beyond the 4.5% requirement, the national contribution 
is also subject to a floor of 10% (or, until the end of 2016, 20%) of the ESM’s 
contribution.132 A more lenient treatment is possible when the requesting country 
is not able to contribute up-front due to fiscal reasons, but only with the 
unanimous agreement of the ESM Board of Governors and on the conditions that 
the country (a) indemnifies the ESM for any loss attributable to the country’s non-
participation and (b) agrees to macroeconomic conditionality.133  
Any decision to use the DRI entails conditionality, both for the bank 
concerned and the requesting country. To start with the bank must be 
restructured, based on a plan drawn by the ESM jointly with the bank and the 
country, in consultation with the ECB as supervisor and the SRB.134 This should 
ensure the bank’s viability following recapitalization.135 Since the recapitalization 
exercise is deemed to be a form of public assistance, the restructuring plan 
                                                     
129 ESM DRI Guideline, arts. 4(6), (7)(c) and 7. As a general rule, the ESM will acquire common shares in 
the troubled bank, but the use of other instruments that count towards the regulatory capital 
requirements (e.g., special shares, hybrid capital instruments or contingent capital) is possible under 
certain conditions; ESM DRI Guideline, art. 10. The resulting participation of the ESM as shareholder of 
the original institution or the bridge bank is of temporary nature, and the ESM will seek appropriate 
opportunities for disinvestment through the sale or redemption of the relevant instruments; ESM DRI 
Guideline, art. 12.  
130 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 2. 
131 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 9(1)(a). 
132 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 9(1)(b) and (2). 
133 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 9(3)‒(4). 
134 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 4(5). 
135 ibid.  
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requires the Commission’s approval, which will be given subject to specific 
conditions.136  
Additional conditions will be set outside the state aid framework in relation 
both to the bank and the country, based on the ESM’s own legal framework. 
Thus, the bank will be subject to further institution-specific conditions, defined by 
the ESM’s Managing Director in liaison with the Commission, the ECB as 
supervisor and the requesting country and incorporated in the institution-specific 
agreement entered into between the ESM, the country and the bank.137 Such 
conditions can affect the bank’s management and internal policies, e.g., by setting 
limits on management remuneration and the dividend policy. More generally, 
although there is no intention to involve the ESM in day-to-day management 
decisions,138 the ESM will be able to influence key aspects of the bank’s future 
business model and governance, both through the institution-specific agreement 
and through its representation in the institution as shareholder.139  
In its turn, the requesting country must agree on a Memorandum of 
Understanding (‘MoU’), imposing conditionality relating to its financial-sector 
policy and even, if this appears appropriate, its macroeconomic situation.140 
Negotiations on the actual content of the MoU will take place separately from the 
determination of the institution-specific conditionality, and will involve the 
requesting country, on the one hand, and the Commission in liaison with the ECB, 
the ESM’s Managing Director and, if appropriate, the IMF, on the other, in a 
manner reminiscent of the Troika’s role in country bailout programmes.141  
Provision has been made for the revision of the DRI’s guidelines every two 
years from the instrument’s introduction, in order to take into account the 
deepening of the Banking Union and the gradual absorption of the national 
banking systems’ legacy problem assets, as well as for a more comprehensive 
review after ten years, to decide whether the instrument should be continued or 
abandoned.142 In particular, the periodic reviews should consider the continuing 
appropriateness of the requirement of a first capital contribution by the requesting 
state.143  
Under the present arrangements, however, it is clear that, even after 2016 
(when the SRM will be fully operational), national governments will be saddled the 
primary financial responsibility in relation to publicly assisted bank bailouts. Even 
where a government finds itself in the unenviable position of needing to finance 
                                                     
136 TFEU, arts. 107‒108; ESM DRI Guideline, arts. 1(3) and 4(4), (11). 
137 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 4(7)(b), (8). On monitoring of compliance with the institution-specific 
conditions and covenants relating to non-compliance, see ESM DRI Guideline, art. 5(2), (8).  
138 ESM, ‘FAQ on the ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument’ (8 December 2014), answer to q. 
15.  
139 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 11. 
140 ESM DRI Guideline, arts. 1(4), second sentence, and 2(2). Even when the country is already in a full 
macroeconomic adjustment programme, specific conditionality, relevant to the use of the DRI, may be 
imposed.  
141 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 4(7)(a).  
142 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 15.  
143 ESM DRI Guideline, art. 15(1).  
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the recapitalization of systemically important banks, while being fiscally too weak 
to do so without external support, the recapitalization will take place, as a rule, on 
the government’s own account, with the ESM providing only indirect assistance, 
in the form of a loan. In contrast, in view of its very strict preconditions and terms 
(not least, the need for unanimity in the ESM’s Board of Governors for its 
activation), the DRI is unlikely to be used in other than wholly exceptional 
circumstances. Even then, the country will need to share a considerable portion of 
the financial burden – and this, despite the fact that it is no longer in charge of the 
troubled bank’s supervision!  
The resulting confinement of the DRI to a limited, supporting role is 
recognized by the ESM itself in unambiguous terms:  
 
When the instrument was first proposed, it was supposed to cut the link 
between troubled credit institutions and sovereigns. However, it soon became 
apparent that the remaining building blocks of the banking union would most 
likely achieve this aim without the need for DRI to provide substantial funds.  
More specifically, the bail-in of private investors (in accordance with the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive), and the contribution of a national 
resolution fund (or Single Resolution Fund from 2016) as a precondition for 
the DRI to be used has shifted the bulk of potential financing from the ESM 
to the institutions themselves, along with their investors and creditors. With 
all the components of banking union set to become operational by January 
2016, the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument will only be applied when all 
burden sharing arrangements specified in the DRI Guideline prove 
insufficient to return a bank to viability, the eligibility criteria regarding the 
requesting ESM Member and institution requiring recapitalisation [...] are met 
and if indirect recapitalisation is not possible.144  
 
The DRI is thus relegated almost to a footnote in the Banking Union’s overall 
design. From 2016 onwards, when the BRRD will be fully effective and the SRM 
fully operational, the DRI will be just one element of a highly complex European 
resolution regime, supported by a variety of financing arrangements. Its restrictive 
conditions of eligibility suggest that it may not be available in all pertinent cases, 
even when the national government is financial weak. The instrument would 
appear better suited to the recapitalization of major systemic banks. For the rest, 





                                                     
144 ESM, ‘FAQ on the ESM Direct Bank Recapitalisation Instrument’ (8 December 2014), answer to q. 3.  
  
Christos Hadjiemmanuil                                     Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union  
 
 35 
6. QUESTIONING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FINANCING 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Even so, the mere existence of a credible fiscal backstop can play a key role in 
assuaging market concerns, facilitating the exit from the crisis and enabling the 
reintegration of banking markets in the euro area. In this context, of course, 
credibility hangs on the sufficiency of the resources that can be mobilized in case 
of need.  
Following political agreement in the Eurogroup, the DRI is currently subject 
to an overall cap of € 60 billion (out of the ESM’s total lending capacity of € 500 
billion). The cap was considered necessary in order to preserve the ESM’s capacity 
for lending to weak sovereigns, to minimize risk (since acquiring an equity 
participation in weak banks is considered riskier than lending to weak sovereigns, 
including when the loan is granted for indirect bank recapitalization purpose), and 
also to ensure that the ESM retains its AAA rating (which might otherwise be 
jeopardized).145 On the other hand, this size appears quite modest and inadequate 
to break conclusively the bank-sovereign loop. An increase of the maximum 
amount is, of course, possible, but (just like each particular activation of the 
instrument) it requires the unanimous agreement of the euro area countries, with 
governments’ acquiescence depending in many cases (most conspicuously, in the 
case of Germany, which contributes some 27% of ESM resources) on prior 
approval by the national parliaments. As for the present € 60 billion cap, it has 
caused considerable consternation. Amongst other critics, the IMF has openly 
expressed doubts about the planned backstop, noting that ‘centralized resolution 
resources may not be sufficient to handle stress in large banks’.146  
Is the criticism justified? It is not easy to say! One cannot predict with any 
accuracy the recapitalization needs of major European banks in a future systemic 
crisis. What is certain is that the euro area is home to a very large banking sector, 
with total assets amounting to more than three times the region’s GDP,147 
concentrated for the most part in the hands of large systemic banks, including a 
number of global systemically important banks, whose recapitalization could 
conceivably require huge resources. In 2011, nine of the region’s thirteen largest 
banks (with assets of over € 500 billion) were based in fiscally weak large 
countries, namely, France, Spain and Italy (the remaining being German or 
Dutch). The total assets of these nine banks ranged from € 1,965 billion (BNP 
Paribas) to € 598 billion (BBVA), while their European assets alone amounted to 
                                                     
145 ibid., answers to q. 16–17.  
146 IMF, ‘2014 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area: Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission’ 
(June 19, 2014), para. 10. In the final staff report, the emphasis is not on the insufficiency of the financial 
resources, but on the exceedingly demanding thresholds for accessing the mechanism, but a reference to 
the need for ‘sufficient common backstops’ can still be found in a table summarizing policy 
recommendations; IMF, Euro Area Policies: Staff Report for the 2014 Article IV Consultation with 
Member Countries’ (25 June 2014), esp. paras. 20 and 51 and Table 2.  
147 According to the ECB’s monetary statistics, in December 2011 total assets amounted to some € 32,5 
trillion, for a GDP of less than € 10 trillion.  
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between € 1,739 (Crédit Agricole) and € 390 billion (BBVA). The Tier I capital 
ranged from € 71 billion (BNP Paribas) to € 28 billion (Crédit Mutuel).148 The 
failure of any of them –even assuming that it would take place in isolation, rather 
than as part of a wider systemic crisis– would require the mobilization of huge 
financial resources. This is also proven by the recent crisis, when certain large 
banks received public assistance in excess of € 100 billion. As an example, the 
public assistance provided by Germany to Hypo Real Estate amounted to € 134 
billion in total – although only a small fraction (€ 9.8 billion) related to capital 
injections, the rest comprising state guarantees.149 Regarding the system-wide 
situation in the aftermath of the crisis, the ECB’s recent comprehensive 
assessment of 130 large European banks150 identified capital shortfalls in 25 banks, 
with a combined shortfall of just € 24.6 billion (large part of which had already 
been covered by the banks by the time of publication of the results).151 However, 
academic analysts, who used multiple benchmark stress tests to produce 
alternative estimates, came up with capital shortfalls ranging from € 82 billion to € 
767 billion, depending on the model.152 Compared to the highest estimates, the 
DRI in its present size pales into insignificance. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to the 2012 debates, when the fiscal backstop was 
intended to provide the primary means for addressing systemic bank troubles, 
especially in the fiscally less robust countries, now it would be wrong to judge the 
DRI separately from the other legal and financing arrangements of the BRRD-
based resolution regime. To start with, the new regime place strong emphasis on 
the avoidance of regulatory forbearance; assuming that resolution will actually be 
triggered as early as possible, an accumulation of losses may be prevented and the 
necessary correction may require less resources. In addition, the tough bail-in 
requirements place a very significant part of the resolution cost on the shoulders 
of the failed bank’s existing stakeholders. Again assuming early identification of 
the failure, this will leave a relative small funding gap, if any. This need not be 
covered out of resources allocated to the DRI. As we have discussed already, the 
relevant DGS should also make a contribution; and the BRRD cascade mandates 
                                                     
148 Data as reported by Daniel Gros and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘European Deposit Insurance and 
Resolution in the Banking Union’ (2014) 52 Journal of Common Market Studies 529, at 541, Table 2.  
149 Figures provided by the German Federal Agency for Financial Market Stabilisation (FMSA), 
http://www.fmsa.de/export/sites/standard/downloads/20140630_Overview_of_SoFFin_measures.pdf.  
150 See above, n. 148 and accompanying text.   
151 ECB, ‘Aggregate Report on the Comprehensive Assessment’ (October 2014), 6.  
152 Viral V. Acharya and Sascha Steffen, ‘Falling Short of Expectations? Stress Testing the Eurozone 
Banking System’, CEPS Policy Brief No. 315 (15 January 2014). The same analysts attribute the startling 
divergence to the results of large banks in large countries, such as France and Germany, which in the 
ECB’s comprehensive assessment appeared not to have capital shortfalls – possibly because systemic risk 
and feedback effects from the financial sector in the real sector, which are captured in the market data, 
were completely ignored in regulatory assessment. They further note that regulatory stress-test outcomes 
may be heavily affected by regulatory discretion in measuring what is ‘capital’ and especially by the risk-
weighting of assets when calculating the prudential capital requirement. Viral Acharya and Sascha Steffen, 
‘Making Sense of the Comprehensive Assessment’, VoxEU.org, 29 October 2014, 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/making-sense-ecb-s-comprehensive-assessment.  
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the use of the resolution fund before public recapitalization assistance can be 
extended.  
With prefunding gradually rising to 1% of covered deposits, the euro area’s 
SRF has a target level of approximately € 55 billion (based on the 2011 volume of 
covered deposits). The SRF can also increase its firepower by borrowing, or by 
raising ex post contributions (although the latter may not be advisable in the midst 
of a crisis, so that the primary use of ex post contributions may be to repay 
borrowings); and there is an agreement in principle for the eventual introduction 
of a common backstop, to provide the SRF with public bridge financing when its 
own resources are not sufficient.153 Just like the DRI, the size of the SRF has been 
criticized as insufficient.154 For a proper assessment of the situation, however, it is 
necessary to add up all prefunded or precommitted sources of financing – the 
SRF’s € 55 billion, the relevant DGS’s level of prefunding, as well as the DRI’s 60 
billion –, because they can all contribute in covering the funding gap (and provide 
cumulative layers of reassurance ex ante). The combined amounts of prefunding 
appear substantial, even though not 100% convincing. The non-mutualization of 
the national DGSs is an evident problem (only partially alleviated by the possibility 
of mutual lending between them). On the other hand, the situation appears under 
a better light, if one also takes into account the borrowing capacity of the SRF, the 
national contribution to recapitalization when the DRI is used, but also the 
possibility of indirect bank recapitalization by the ESM, which raises very 
significantly the cap on available resources.  
All in all, in view of the emphasis placed by the new European legislation on 
strict enforcement (including by way of extensive bail-in of stakeholders) and of 
the strict limits on the nature and extent of any external (industry-funded or 
public) assistance, it would be fair to say that the combined size (precommitted 
and potentially callable resources) of the various financial instruments may be 
enough for the operation of the resolution regime in a normalized environment.155 
When fully built up, the resources might even suffice for the resolution of one of 
the largest European banks, assuming that this takes place in relative isolation. It is 
certainly possible that additional financial means will be needed in the event of a 
wider systemic crisis. Ad hoc bailout packages may then appear necessary. If so, the 
main impediment would not be the ‘low’ level of prefunded financial instruments, 
because there is simply no good reason to fully cover in advance the cost of a tail 
risk.  
In this eventuality, the political dynamics are bound to result in a greater 
willingness to mobilize public resources in support of shaky banks, in various 
                                                     
153 ‘Statement of Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on the SRM Backstop’ (18 December 2013). 
154 According to one estimate, to be fully credible, the fund should have a size of over € 500 billion, 
mostly prefunded, with a common DGS contributing, for good measure, another € 96 billion; Mats 
Persson and Raoul Ruparel, ‘The Eurozone Banking Union: A Game of Two Halves’, Open Europe 
working paper (December 2012), pp. 10–11. 
155 Thomas Huertas and María J. Nieto, ‘How much is enough? The Case of the Resolution Fund in 
Europe’, VoxEU.org, 18 March 2014, http://www.voxeu.org/article/ensuring-european-resolution-fund-
large-enough.  
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forms (central bank liquidity assistance, state guarantees, state loans to the SRF or 
an increase in the capacity of the ESM, or even full nationalization of weak banks). 
The true limitation would then lie in the inflexibility of the current approach to 
resolution, as entrenched in the BRRD and related legal texts. Due to its formal 
legal character, the new system may operate as a major structural straightjacket, 
hampering the shift for an ex ante commitment to rigorous enforcement to an ex 
post stance of extensive forbearance. A resolution regime specifically designed to 
shift the costs of resolution back to the banks’ private shareholders and to set 
relatively strict limits on taxpayers’ exposure is inherently unable to provide a 
credible promise that all and sundry will be salvaged. Irrespectively of the financial 
arrangements backstopping the system, the legal strictures of the BRRD will tend 
to increase uncertainty in the run up to a crisis (since the prospect of bail-in will 
cause consternation in the ranks of non-protected claim holders). This, however, is 
a price that the legislator has decided to pay in order to restore market discipline, 
improve the banking industry’s incentive structure by containing moral hazard, 
and remove the implicit subsidy to large banks by ensuring that no bank is too big 




7. A STABLE COMPROMISE? 
 
Turning to the broader picture, the move to the Banking Union has clearly been 
the most significant regulatory outcome of the crisis – a change of regime, rather 
than an act of institutional tinkering. The implications for the development of the 
European financial markets, as well as for the operation and viability of the 
monetary union, are bound to be profound. The transition to the new regime is 
not yet complete. Its completion will take years. But already the basic structure has 
been put in place.  
Despite divergences between the euro area’s governments, in so far as the 
administrative side is concerned, the architecture of the Banking Union by and 
large conforms to the original blueprint, as set out by the European Commission 
in the second semester of 2012. On the other hand, with regard to the financing of 
resolution actions, the emerging European resolution regime departs from, if it 
does not subvert, the original assumptions of the Banking Union project. In 2012, 
the expectation was that bailouts would continue to dominate bank resolution for 
the foreseeable future, roughly on the same lines as in the early phase of the global 
financial crisis, and that the shift to a centralized system of supervision would 
simply make possible the mutualiziation, through the ESM, of the costs of 
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recapitalization with public funds.156 The eventual legislation, however, provides 
clear directions on the appropriate treatment of failed banks and sets strict limits, 
at least in principle, on the passing on of losses to taxpayers. And a shift in 
political positions by Germany and other strong economies has effectively led to 
the postponement sine die of the arrangements relating to the supranational 
financing of resolution; and, in any event, the mutualization of ‘legacy’ problems 
remains unlikely. 
In terms of the longer term development of the euro area’s banking industry, 
the current SRM’s financing arrangements leave much to be desired. Even if the 
targeted levels of funding are sufficient, the modalities are unlikely to contribute to 
the equalization of monetary and banking conditions in the euro area. As long as 
the fiscal backstops remain primarily national, there can be no true Banking 
Union! Differences in the level of sovereign risk will remain relevant, and the 
continuing possibility of country-specific shocks will continue to demarcate 
banking markets. Political risks may further perpetuate fragmentation, because 
even those elements of the fiscal backstop which have been mutualized in the 
ESM are not characterized by automaticity, but require in each case of activation 
the unanimous agreement of the euro area’s countries. Thus, the actual availability 
of the instruments can only be determined ex post facto, on the basis of a political 
process. This builds a significant element of ambiguity and unpredictability into 
the system and reduces its credibility. As the legacy assets of the pre-crisis period 
disappear and the quality of regulation is increasingly seen to depend on the 
actions of the ECB, rather than of the national authorities, it will become harder 
and harder to justify the need for national participation in burden sharing. 
Eventually, the Banking Union will require fully centralized and uniform 
resolution financing mechanisms.  
 
                                                     
156 This was exactly the point emphasized in the statement of the Euro Area Summit on 29 June 2012: 
‘When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro 
area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly.’  
